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My dissertation, Essays in Behavioral and Experiment economics, is composed by three 
different research studies. In Chapter 1, the study offers an alternative theory of decision 
making under uncertainty. The presence of some perceived ambiguity together with some 
ambiguity tolerance leads a risk-averse decision-maker with diminishing marginal utility 
over all income levels to nonetheless take a chance.  This alternative theory also provides 
an explanation for the equity premium puzzle, and for why a risk-averse buyer of insurance 
may also exhibit loss aversion. In Chapter 2, the study examines the effects of punishment, 
communication, and the interaction of these mechanisms on trusting and trustworthy 
behaviors in a laboratory experiment. The results suggest that the presence of both 
punishment and communication options places a downward pressure on the trustee to 
reduce trustworthy behaviors. However, if trustor expresses the highest level of trust 
accompanied by communication without implementing any punishment threat, the 
trustee’s trustworthiness significantly increases. In Chapter 3, the study presents a 
theoretical model of play in the trust game that specifically features the potential which 
proposing equality has for promoting positive reciprocal behavior. The model proposes the 
utility function where the second mover appreciates the first mover that intends to split all 
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It is theoretically challenging to explain why the same person would 
rationally buy insurance but also gamble. Likewise, it is challenging to 
explain why the same person would take a chance to avoid a loss (i.e., 
exhibit loss aversion), yet also not take chances on comparable uncertain 
gains.  The standard explanation has been a preference explanation: The 
decision-maker is risk seeking with increasing marginal utility over some 
income levels but risk averse with decreasing marginal utility over other 
income levels.  Here, we provide an alternative explanation: The presence 
of some perceived ambiguity together with some ambiguity tolerance leads 
a risk-averse decision-maker with diminishing marginal utility over all 
income levels to nonetheless take a chance.  This alternative theory also 
provides an explanation for the equity premium puzzle, and for why a risk-















When people make choices under uncertainty, they sometimes exhibit puzzling 
behaviors.  A person who buys insurance also gambles.    A person who takes a chance to 
avoid a loss also does not take a chance to obtain a comparable gain.   One solution to 
these two puzzles is the hypothesis that the decision maker is risk averse in some 
situations but risk seeking in others, or equivalently that marginal utility is decreasing 
over some changes in wealth but increasing over others.    Here, an alternative hypothesis 
is presented:  Puzzling and seemingly contradictory behaviors under uncertainty can be 
explained by the ambiguity the decision maker perceives combined with the decision 
maker’s degree of ambiguity tolerance, with the characteristics of the decision also 
playing a role.  
Friedman and Savage (1948) show the coexistence of gambling and insurance can 
be explained by a utility function with convex as well as concave segments.  Markowitz 
(1952) suggests a utility function with two concave segments and two convex segments. 
The arguments of Freidman, Savage, and Markowitz are well-known, yet scholars have 
continued to explore the shape of the utility function (e.g., Gregory (1980), Katz (1983), 
Dobbs (1988)).   In offering their innovation, Friedman and Savage note that scholars 
preceding them had been reluctant to accept the assumption of increasing marginal 
utility, and their important contribution did not extinguish the reluctance.  Their work has 
been followed by explanations of the coexistence of gambling and insurance that do not 





on borrowing (Hakansson, 1970), and the indivisibility of expenditures (Ng, 1975).   The 
innovation in this paper is to place ambiguity at the heart of an explanation. 
In developing their prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) followed the 
Friedman-Savage-Markowitz approach.  A theory of loss aversion is introduced by 
assuming the utility function convex for negative changes in wealth, while a theory of 
risk aversion is maintained for gains by assuming the utility function concave for positive 
changes in wealth.    More precisely, for gains, their theory implies a decision maker will 
tend to prefer a sure gain to a chance which yields that same gain as an expected value.  
Conversely, there will be a tendency to take a chance to avoid a sure loss equal to the 
expected value of the chance.   
The assumption that the utility function is convex in losses can explain loss 
aversion, but it presents a problem for explaining why the same person would also buy 
insurance, so prospect theory needs an additional modification to describe behavior under 
uncertainty more generally.  The standard modification (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 
(1984, 1990), Kosegi and Rabin (2006), Barseghyan et al. (2011)) proposes that decision 
makers to do not apply objective probabilities but rather apply subjective probabilities 
that are biased in a specific way.    The bias imbedded into the standard “probability 
weighting function” is that the decision-maker’s subjective probability is greater than the 
objective probability when the probability is low and less than the objective probability 
when the probability is high.  In the typical insurance situation, the objective probability 
of loss is low and the probability of no loss is high.  Therefore, if a decision maker 





convex utility function can be overcome, so the decision maker should rationally to pay a 
premium for insurance to avoid taking a chance.  
Like prospect theory, our theory assumes the decision maker does not apply an 
objective probability distribution with precision.   However, rather than directly assuming 
a bias, our theory assumes the known distribution is hidden to some degree by perceived 
ambiguity.   Once ambiguity is introduced, outcomes cannot be objectively weighted by a 
single probability distribution.  The Hurwicz (1951) Criterion suggests people cope with 
ambiguity by giving decision weight to outcomes, ranging from the extremely optimist 
maxmax criterion to the extremely pessimistic maxmin criterion.  Our theory is a 
derivative of the  Alpha Minimax Expected Utility (𝛼 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑈) theory, developed by 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), a general theory of decision making under uncertain 
which combines expected utility theory with the Hurwicz Criterion.   
In our version of the 𝛼 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑈 theory, the decision maker’s degree of optimism 
is parameterized (as in the Hurwicz Criterion), and so is the degree of ambiguity.    An 
underlying “anchor probability distribution” is the unique probability distribution the 
decision maker will apply when there is no ambiguity.   This distribution is never 
subjectively biased by the decision-maker, and our utility function is always concave so 
the decision maker is always risk averse.  However, the decision-maker’s degree of 
optimism introduces a bias once ambiguity is present.  Pessimism, or a lack of optimism, 
implies ambiguity only reinforces the assumed risk aversion and makes the decision 
maker not want to take changes.  Optimism, on the other hand, can make ambiguity offset 





possible outcome (or stake) each offset the risk aversion, making it possible for the risk 
aversion decision maker to nonetheless rationally take a chance. 
Because ambiguity is necessary for chance taking in our theory, it is worth 
recognizing that ambiguity is ubiquitous.  In particular, previous work indicates people 
will tend to perceive ambiguity even when it might seem there should be none. Mulligan 
(2012) points out that our knowledge of external reality can never be perfect.  We are 
cognitively limited, often lacking the sophistication necessary to assess probabilities and 
apply them.    Moreover, our knowledge that external reality can be biased can introduce 
ambiguity.  For example, it is well known that Joseph Jagger, a mechanical engineer, is 
attributed “breaking the bank at Monte Carlo”  in 1873 (even though he did not put the 
casino out of business) by identifying nine numbers on a particular roulette wheel which 
occurred more frequently.   
Gambling fallacies may, at least in certain situations or to some extent, amount to 
decision maker optimism combined with perceived ambiguity. Walker (1985; 1992) 
provides evidence that gamblers generally hold a set of false beliefs about the likelihood 
of winning and the nature of gambling, with a tendency toward over-estimating their own 
ability to win. Langer (1975) finds that raffle ticket buyers generally believe the ticket 
they choose themselves is more likely to win than the ticket the vendor chooses. 
Similarly, Dickerson, Fabre and Bayliss (1986) reported that about 44% of TAB punters 
(horse race betters in New Zealand and Australia) reveal that their bet selections are 
based upon their own skills. Levy and Levy (2001) find  decision-makers often construct 





probabilities.  These biases all have a flavor of optimism, and if ambiguity is not 
evidently present (as it is with horseracing) then part of a gambler’s fallacy might be the 
perception of ambiguity when little to none is present. 
Our theory also offers a solution to the equity premium puzzle. Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) demonstrated that the difference between the average rate of return on 
stock from holding bonds is too large to be explained by risk aversion alone.  Several 
possible behavioral explanations to the puzzle have been offered, including fear of 
disaster (Reiz, 1988), habit information (Otrok, Ravikumar and Whiteman, 2002), first-
order risk aversion (Epstein and Zin, 1990), and disappointment aversion (Ang, Bekart 
and Liu, 2000).   The most notable explanation is “myopic loss aversion” (Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1995), the idea that stocks are especially avoided because they can generate short 
term losses.   Our model suggests ambiguity will augment risk aversion in the typical 
stock purchase situation, more so than with bonds, offering an explanation for the 
premium return required for the purchase of stock.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a model of 
decision making under uncertainty, first examining no ambiguity, then total ambiguity, 
and then the 𝛼 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑈 model which combines risk and ambiguity. Section 3 derives 
the general implications of the model.  Section 4 applies the model to four behaviors that 
have been of general interest:  Section 5 concludes.    
2. Model 
Assume a decision-maker DM must choose an alternative 𝑎 from 𝑁 mutually 





upon which state 𝜃 arises from among mutually 𝐾 exclusive states Θ = {1,2, … , 𝐾}. 
When alternative 𝑎 is chosen and state 𝜃 occurs, DM experiences the outcome 𝑥 =
𝑥(𝑎, 𝜃), which provides utility 𝑢(𝑥(𝑎, 𝜃)).  It is assumed 𝑢′(𝑥) > 0, meaning DM 
perceives more is better.  It is also assumed  𝑢′′(𝑥) < 0, meaning DM is risk averse.    
2.1 Special Case 1:  No Ambiguity 
  When there is no ambiguity, the probability of each possible state is known, so DM 
experiences pure risk.   To be specific, assume the likelihood of state 𝜃𝑖 is 𝑓(𝜃𝑖)  ∈ [0,1] 
and  ∑ 𝑓(𝜃𝑖)
𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1  = 1.    In this case, expected utility theory asserts that an optimal choice 
by DM will maximize expected utility, where the expected utility of action a is given by 
(1)    𝐸[𝑢(𝑥(𝑎, 𝜃))] =  ∑ 𝑓(𝜃𝑖)𝑢(𝑥(𝑎, 𝜃))
𝑖=𝐾
𝑖=1 . 
 To consider the simplest case, assume there are just two states of nature: good and 
bad.  The good state occurs with probability 𝑝, while the bad state occurs with 
probability 1 − 𝑝.   There are two alternatives available to DM.  One is the uncertain 
“prospect” (𝑝, 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥), which yields the outcome 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 in the good state and 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 <
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 in the bad state.  The other alternative is a choice that yields the expected outcome 
(2) 𝐸[𝑥] ≡ ?̅? =  𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛      
with certainty.   
 The utility of the certain choice is 𝑢(?̅?) = 𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛), the  utility of 
the expected outcome.    The utility of the prospect (𝑝, 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) is the expected utility  





Figure 1 compares these to alternative choices.  The well-known result is shown:  If a 
decision-maker is risk averse, then the utility of receiving the expected outcome x̅ with 
certainty is greater than the expected utility of the prospect (𝑝, 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥); i.e., 𝑢(?̅?) >
𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)].     
 Consequently, as shown in Figure 1, there exists a certainty equivalent 𝑥, such that 
𝑢(?̂?) = 𝐸[u(x)].  If DM repeatedly chooses the prospect, or if many decision makers like 
DM were to choose the prospect, then the mean outcome will be x̅, which is greater than 
x̂.  This provides an opportunity for an organization to pool the outcomes of decision 
makers choosing the uncertain action and provide insurance.  The quantity x̅ − x̂ is the 
maximum amount the pooling organization (e.g. investment fund, insurance company) 
can take from each decision maker as a fee such that decision makers identical to DM 
would desire to trade away the uncertain prospect and receive in exchange a certain 
outcome provided by the pooling organization. 









     
𝑢(𝑥) 
𝑢(𝑥) 
𝑢(?̂?) = 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] = 𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
𝑢(?̅?) = 𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 
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This standard case of decision making under pure risk provides a baseline against 
which decision making under ambiguity can be compared.   A risk averse decision maker 
in a pure risk environment will not prefer the uncertain prospect (p, xmin, xmax) to 
receiving the certain outcome ?̅?.   Our interest is in identifying the circumstances in which 
a risk averse decision maker may nonetheless prefer the uncertain alternative when the 
uncertainty is not pure risk but involves some degree of ambiguity. 
2.2  Special Case 2:  Total Ambiguity 
When DM faces total ambiguity, the choice must be made without any 
information about the probabilities of the possible states of nature.  Facing this situation, 
the Hurwicz (1951)  Criterion asserts DM will evaluate the uncertain prospect based upon 
the sizes of the outcomes.  The simplest Hurwicz Criterion only allocates decision weight 
to the largest and smallest outcomes expected across the various possible states.  DM is 
more optimistic when more weight is allocated to the largest outcome, and more 
pessimistic when more weight is allocated to the smallest outcome.  Optimism is 
equivalent to being tolerant of the ambiguity, while pessimism is equivalent to being 
ambiguity intolerant.   
Letting  𝛼 denote the degree of optimism, or degree of ambiguity tolerance, the 
Hurwicz valuation of the uncertain outcome can be presented as 
(4)  𝐻 = 𝛼 [𝑢 (max
𝜃
[𝑥(𝑎, 𝜃)])] + [1 − 𝛼] [𝑢 (min
𝜃
[𝑥(𝑎, 𝜃)])] ,               0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1. 
When 𝛼 = 1, the Hurwicz Criterion becomes the maxmax criterion, and DM possesses 





Hurwicz Criterion becomes the maxmin criterion, and DM possesses the highest possible 
degree of pessimism or ambiguity intolerance.    
 In the simplified two state of the world, the choice under uncertainty yields one of 
two outcomes.  Call the two possible outcomes  𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥, and say DM takes the 
“chance” (𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) when the uncertain alternative is chosen.  The Hurwitz criterion 
(4) indicates DM would in this case receive the utility  
(5)   𝐻 = 𝛼𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝛼]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛). 
Why would risk averse DM choose to take the chance (𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) when facing 
ambiguity rather than choose the alternative that yields ?̅? with certainty?   The reason is 
optimism.  Optimism plays no role in decision making when there is no ambiguity, but it 
can move DM to take the chance when the decision environment is ambiguous.   More 
optimism places more decision weight on the maximum possible outcome in condition 
(5).  This is what makes it possible for the chance to look better than the certain outcome.         
2.3  Combining Risk and Ambiguity: An 𝜶 − 𝑴𝑴𝑬𝑼 Model  
The Alpha Minimax Expected Utility (𝛼 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑈) model, developed by Gilboa 
and Schmeidler (1989), combines risk and ambiguity.  The model used here, developed 
by Melkonyan and Pingle (2010), is a version of the 𝛼 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑈 which parameterizes the 
degree of ambiguity.  This parameterization is useful because tradeoffs can be 
characterized that exist between the degree of ambiguity and other factors.   The utility 
value of uncertain alternative 𝑎, given by our 𝛼 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑈 model, is given by: 
(6) 𝑉(𝑎) = (1 − 𝜆) ∑ 𝑓(𝜃𝑖)𝑢(𝑥(𝑎, 𝜃))𝑖=𝐾𝑖=1 +  𝜆 [𝛼 [𝑢 (max
𝜃







The parameter 𝜆 measures the degree of ambiguity, where 0 ≤  𝜆 ≤ 1.  When  𝜆 = 0, the 
𝛼 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑈 model reduces to the Expected Utility Model (1) and DM faces pure risk.  
Alternatively, when  𝜆 = 1, the model reduces to the Hurwicz Model (5) and DM faces 
total ambiguity.  The general case lies between the extremes.   The probability 
distribution 𝑓(𝜃) is called the “anchor probability distribution.”  When there is some 
ambiguity (𝜆 > 0), the uncertainty is anchored by the distribution 𝑓(𝜃), but DM cannot 
see 𝑓(𝜃) with clarity. As the degree of ambiguity decreases, the distribution 𝑓(𝜃) 
becomes more apparent.    
 In the simple two state case, the 𝛼 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑈 model reduces to 




 In this section, a series of meaningful implications of the 𝛼 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑈 model (7) are 
derived.   
Proposition 1:  For the chance (𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛), which yields minimax expected utility 𝑉(𝑥)  
given in (7) when there is ambiguity (i. e., 𝜆 > 0) and expected utility 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] given in 
(3) when there is no ambiguity (i. e., 𝜆 = 0),  














Proposition 1 tells us when the minimax expected utility 𝑉(𝑥) is greater than the 
expected utility valuation 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] versus when it is less.   That is, it tells us when 
ambiguity makes the uncertain alternative look better and when worse.    
Proposition 2:  If there is some ambiguity, so 𝜆 > 0, then 𝑉(𝑥) > 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)]  if and only if 
𝛼 > 𝑝.   
Proof:  This proposition follows directly from Proposition 1 since 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) > 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛). 
Proposition 2 indicates DM must be sufficiently optimistic in order for ambiguity 
to enhance DM perception of the uncertain alternative.    The sufficient level is greater 
when the likelihood of the good outcome is higher.  Put another way, if DM is ambiguity 
intolerant (low 𝛼), then DM ambiguity will make the uncertain alternative look less 
attractive unless the likelihood of the good outcome is very low.      
Condition (8) indicates the degree of ambiguity 𝜆 and the size of the stake 
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) each magnify the perception DM has of the uncertain alternative.  
When DM is sufficiently optimistic, so 𝛼 > 𝑝, an increase in ambiguity 𝜆 or in the stake 
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) increases the difference between 𝑉(𝑥) and 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)], providing more 
reason for DM to take the chance.  Alternatively, when DM is sufficiently pessimistic, so 
𝛼 > 𝑝,  more ambiguity or larger stakes only reinforce not taking the chance.      
 Propositions 1 and 2 provide insight for empirical studies of ambiguity.    
Presuming people differ with regard to their degree of ambiguity tolerance (different 
levels for 𝛼), Proposition 2 indicates we would not expect subjects to reveal their 
different tolerances when the probability 𝑝 of the good outcome is high.    Rather, 





Because 𝛼 > 𝑝 is necessary but not sufficient for 𝑉(𝑥) > 𝑈(?̅?), increasing the degree of 
ambiguity and the stake in the experiment should elicit responses that allow differing 
levels of ambiguity tolerance to be identified.  Optimistic decision makers have high 
ambiguity tolerance (high 𝛼), so they will opt for chance alternatives over certain 
alternatives before less optimistic decision makers who have low ambiguity tolerance 
(low 𝛼).   
Proposition 3: For the chance alternative yielding the minimax expected utility 𝑉(𝑥) 
given by (7) when there is ambiguity and expected outcome ?̅? = 𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 
when there is no ambiguity,  












Proof: See Appendix 
 Proposition (3) indicates when risk aversion is overcome by optimism under 
ambiguity, and when it is not.    Equivalently, condition (9) indicates when DM will opt 
to take the chance (𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) over accepting the outcome ?̅? with certainty, and when 
not.   Notice 𝛼 > 𝑝 is necessary for 𝑉(𝑥) > 𝑢(?̅?), so will opt DM to take a chance, but 
not sufficient.   It is apparent from condition (9) that DM will take with low degrees of 
ambiguity and ambiguity tolerance only if the probability 𝑝 is very low.   Proposition 4 
more carefully delineates how the willingness of DM to take a chance depends upon the 






Proposition 4: If there is some ambiguity (i.e.,  𝜆 > 0), and some ambiguity tolerance 










and ?̅? is increasing in 𝜆 and in 𝛼, and ?̅? → 1 as 𝜆𝛼 → 1  
Proof: See Appendix  
Figure 2 provides some intuition of Proposition 4, and offers insight into how the 
three parameters 𝑝,  𝜆, and 𝛼 affect the willingness of DM to take the chance.    The two 
sides of the right most inequality in (9) are plotted as they depend upon the probability p, 
along with the function f(p) = V(x) − u(x̅). The left side of (9) is linear and decreasing 
in p, while the risk aversion assumption implies the right side increases from zero in 𝑝 
but then deceases back to zero.   As p → 0, the left side of (9) converges to λα, while the 
right side of (9) converges to zero.  Thus, for values of p near zero, V(𝑥) > u(?̅?).  
Alternatively, as p → 1, the left side of (9) converges to λ[α − 1], while the right side of 
(9) converges to zero.  Thus, for values of p near 1, V(𝑥) < u(?̅?).    Thus, we know DM 
will take a chance under ambiguity when p is very low, and we know DM will not take a 

















At 𝑝 = 0, the derivative f ′(𝑝) is negative, indicating an increase in p from zero 
makes taking the chance look less attractive.    The case drawn in Figure 2 indicates f(𝑝) 
is strictly decreasing in p, which is one of two possible cases and is the case that will hold 
when the level of ambiguity is high.    In the other case, f(p) decreases to a value less 
than λ[α − 1] and then increases to λ[α − 1] when 𝑝 = 1.    Because 𝑓′′(𝑝) is positive 
over the whole domain, in either case, f(p) decreases until it equals zero at that value  
𝑝 = ?̅? and cannot return to zero, so ?̅? is unique.   An increase in λ or α increase ?̅? up to a 
maximum value (less than one) when λα = 1.   That is, when there is more ambiguity or 
more ambiguity tolerance (more optimism),  it is more possible that DM will take 
chances when 𝑝 is at a higher level.     
Looking toward applications, condition (9) indicates, as long as 𝛼 > 𝑝, the 
amount of ambiguity 𝜆 can be small and the risk averse decision maker will still opt to 
take the chance when the stake 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) is large enough.  A lottery is 
interesting in this respect because the stake gets larger as more people play.  Also, the 
𝑓(𝑝) 
𝜆𝛼 
𝜆[𝛼 − 1] 
1 
?̅? 
𝜆[𝛼 − 𝑝] 
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probability of the good outcome, winning the lottery, gets smaller as more people play.  
Thus, even if there is only a small amount of ambiguity in the mind of the potential 
lottery player and just a small amount of optimism, then there is a lottery size large 
enough that all will want to play.    We will show this carefully in the next section.   
Similar logic can explain why people would rather tend to play a higher stakes 
bet, like playing a number in roulette rather than a color.  We examine this below as a 
second example. 
This model also offers an explanation for why the same person might be loss 
averse in one situation but buy insurance in another.  We can examine a potential loss by 
making 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 a negative number (the possible loss) while making 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 equal to zero (no 
loss).   For a given level of ambiguity tolerance 𝛼, our model indicates insurance will be 
desirable in the most typical situation where the probability of the loss is low or the 
probability 𝑝 of no loss is high.    Conversely, our model predicts loss aversion (i.e., take 
a chance in order to avoid a certain loss) in the opposite kinds of situations where 𝑝 is 
low and the probability of loss is high.   Our model also predicts optimistic people are 
more prone to displaying loss aversion.  Insurance versus loss aversion is fleshed out 
below as a third application. 
Finally, our model helps explain the equity premium puzzle, and this is presented 
as a fourth application.  When the probability of the good outcome is reasonably high, 
which should be true for companies that attract investment in their equity securities, we 
would expect 𝛼 < 𝑝.  With 𝛼 < 𝑝, more ambiguity and a higher stake compound the risk 





attractive relative to a sure thing.  That is, the risk premium paid on equities is higher 
than can be explained by risk aversion alone because ambiguity and high stakes increase 
the premium required to make the investment alternative comparably attract to 
alternatives with less ambiguity and lower stakes.    
4. Application 
Application 1: Why Might a Risk Averse Decision-Maker Play a Fair Lottery?  
Consider a fair lottery in which each participant buys a dollar lottery ticket and 
each ticket has an equal chance of winning. With 𝑁 participants, the probability of 
winning is 1/𝑁, and the probability of losing is [𝑁 − 1]/𝑁.  The net winnings of the 
winner is 𝑁 − 1 dollars, and the 𝑁 − 1 losers each lose one dollar.  The expected value of 








which is zero.    DM’s expected utility associated with the purchase of a lottery ticket is 
(12) 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] = [
1
𝑁





where 𝑥 is the change in wealth experienced by DM, and 𝑢(𝑥) is the utility of this change 
in wealth. 
When there is no ambiguity (𝜆 = 0), the assumed concavity of the utility function 
implies the utility of the expected value of zero change in wealth that can be obtained by 
not playing the lottery is strictly greater the expected utility of playing; 𝑢 (
1
𝑁







[−1]) = 𝑢(0) > [
1
𝑁
] 𝑢(𝑁 − 1) + [
𝑁−1
𝑁
] 𝑢(−1). That is, risk averse DM will not play 
the lottery if the uncertainty is pure risk, no matter how large the prize.   
Friedman and Savage (1948) offer an explanation for why, under pure risk, 
someone would not only rationally play the lottery but also rationally buy insurance.   
They reference the following Alfred Marshall quote to provide the essence of their 
explanation: “Uncertainty … which does not appeal to great ambition or lofty aspirations 
has special attractions for very few … and acts as a deterrent to many.  … But, if [it] 
offers a few extreme prizes, its attractiveness is increased all out of proportion…( 
Friedman and Savage 1948, p. 284) .”  Friedman and Savage note that, prior to their 
analysis, economists were reluctant to assume anything other than a diminishing marginal 
utility for wealth.  The contribution of Friedman and Savage (1948) was to show that one 
can explain gambling by assuming an increasing marginal utility for wealth at higher 
wealth levels, while maintaining a willingness to buy insurance by assuming diminishing 
marginal utility for losses.  The behavioral intuition for assuming an increasing marginal 
utility at higher wealth level is the idea that people will seek risk when the increase in 
wealth is fundamentally significant, perhaps life changing.  For example, Friedman and 
Savage mention moving up in socioeconomic class 
Figure 3 illustrates the Friedman-Savage explanation for the lottery.  Two 
situations are shown.  There are more participants in situation B, so lottery prize 
(𝑁 − 1)𝐵 is greater.   In situation A, even though the marginal utility has started to 
increase, 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)]𝐴 < 𝑢(0) holds, implying   DM prefers not playing the lottery. The 





lottery.   In situation B,  𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)]𝐵 > 𝑢(0). The lottery prize (𝑁 − 1)𝐵 is large enough 
that the increasing marginal utility has sufficient impact to make playing the lottery 
attractive.     The quantity ?̂?𝐵 > 0 is the maximum DM would be willing to pay to play 
the lottery, and it is this willingness to pay that allows organizations to offer lotteries that 
are not fair but can still attract participants. 











     
Our theory offers an alternative explanation to the Friedman-Savage explanation.  
Rather than assuming the marginal utility of wealth increases at some point, our theory is 
consistent with the thinking prior to Friedman and Savage which assumed the marginal 
utility of wealth consistently diminishes.  The willingness of DM to take a chance in our 
theory does not rely upon risk seeking preferences, but rather relies upon a combination 
of ambiguity and optimism. 
𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)]𝐴 = 𝑢(𝑝(𝑁 − 1)𝐴 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(−1)) 
𝑢(𝑥) 
𝑢(0) =  𝑢(?̅?) 
−1 
(𝑁 − 1)𝐴 
𝑥 
0 (𝑁 − 1)𝐵 









Applying condition (7), the minimax utility of DM is 
(13) 𝑉(𝑥) = [1 − 𝜆] [[1
𝑁
] 𝑢(𝑁 − 1) + [
𝑁−1
𝑁
] 𝑢(−1)] + 𝜆[𝛼[𝑢(𝑁 − 1)] + [1 − 𝛼][𝑢(−1)]]. 
Because the expected value of this fair lottery is ?̅? =
1
𝑁
[𝑁 − 1] +
𝑁−1
𝑁
[−1] = 0, the utility 
of the expected value, 𝑢(?̅?) = 𝑢(0), is the same as the utility of not playing the lottery.  It 
follows that DM will prefer playing the lottery when 𝑉(𝑥) > 𝑢(0).  Using (9),  𝑉(𝑥) >
𝑢(0) holds if and only if 













As the number of lottery participants 𝑁 increases, the right side of (14) converges to zero 
and the left side of (14) converges to 𝜆𝛼.   Therefore, as long as there is some ambiguity 
(𝜆 > 0) and some ambiguity tolerance (𝛼 > 0), an increase in the number of participants 
𝑁 will enhance the attractiveness of the lottery and eventually induce DM to play the 
lottery.    
 Condition (14) cannot hold if 𝛼 < 1/𝑁 or if 𝜆 is very small.  Thus, our theory 
indicates those attracted to the early stages of a lottery will be those who are more 
optimistic (𝛼 large) and those who perceive more ambiguity (𝜆 large).   However, as the 
size of the lottery prize grows, those who are more pessimistic and who perceive less 
ambiguity will find the lottery attractive.  Condition (14) indicates those who perceive 
little ambiguity (𝜆 near 0) and who are quite pessimistic (𝛼 near 0) will not tend to play 
the lottery, but even these people will be attracted to play if the lottery prize gets large 






 Figure 4 presents how DM would view the lottery if there is no ambiguity.   As the 
number of lottery participants increases, the expected value of the lottery remains at zero 
even though the prize increases from (𝑁 − 1)𝐴 to (𝑁 − 1)𝐵,  However, the diminishing 
marginal utility assumption (or risk aversion assumption) causes expected utility to 
decrease from 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)]𝐴 to  𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)]𝐵.  Risk aversion also implies 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)]𝐴 <  𝑢(0), so 
DM does not find the lottery attractive when the lottery prize is smaller.  The increase in 
the size of the lottery makes the lottery look worse relative to not playing.  DM would be 
willing to pay up to ?̂?𝐴 to avoid playing the lottery when the lottery prize is (𝑁 − 1)𝐴 and 
pay ?̂?𝐵 to avoid playing when the lottery prize is (𝑁 − 1)𝐵.    
How do optimism and ambiguity combine to overcome this risk aversion and get 
DM to take a chance and play the lottery?  When 𝛼 > 𝑝 = 1/𝑁, the optimism of DM 
places more weight on the good outcome (the utility 𝑢(𝑁 − 1) of the lottery prize) than 
the probability 𝑝 puts on it when there is no ambiguity.  More ambiguity magnifies this 
impact and allows the weight that optimism places on the good outcome to overcome the 
risk aversion.    As the number of participants in the lottery grows, the stake 𝑢(𝑁 − 1) −
𝑢(−1) grows and the probability 𝑝 = 1/𝑁 decreases.  Both of these changes also 
magnify the impact which the degree of optimism 𝛼 places on the good outcome relative 
to the weight the probability 𝑝 places on the good outcome.  An extremely large lottery, 







Figure 4:  The Lottery Under Pure Risk  
 
Application 2:  Why might a Risk Averse Decision Maker Prefer a Higher Variance 
Bet? 
 
 The standard American roulette wheel has 38 slots; 18 Red, 18 black, and 2 green.  
The red and black slots are numbered 1 to 36.  The green slots are numbered 0 and 00.   
A decision maker can make a variety of bets in the roulette game.  Here, a $1 bet on red 
will be compared to $1 bet on a single number.  
 For a $1 bet on red, DM receives back the $1 bet plus an additional dollar if the ball 
falls into a red slot.   Alternatively, DM loses the $1 bet amount if the ball falls into a 
black or green slot. Assuming the wheel is fair, the probability 𝑝 of a red outcome is 
18/38, implying the probability of not red is 1 − 𝑝 = 20/38.  Thus, the expected outcome 
















suppose DM bets $1 on number 3.  If the ball lands in the number 3 slot, DM receives the 
$1 bet back and an additional $35.   Alternatively, DM will lose the $1 bet if the ball 
lands in any of the other 37 slots. The probability 𝑝 of winning $35 is 1/38 while the 
probability 1 − 𝑝 of losing $1 bet is 37/38, so the expected outcome of the $1 bet on the 











 Figure 5 presents how DM would perceive the two bets when there is no ambiguity. 
For either bet, the expected outcome is the same:  ?̅?𝑅 = ?̅?3 =  −0.0526.  Risk aversion 
implies 𝐸[𝑢(?̅?𝑅)] < 𝑢(0) and 𝐸[𝑢(?̅?3)] < 𝑢(0), so DM will neither find it attractive to 
play the red bet nor the single number bet.  The risk aversion assumption also implies 
𝐸[𝑢(?̅?𝑅)] > 𝐸[𝑢(?̅?3)], so the lower variance red bet appears better to DM than the higher 
variance single number bet.  









     
  
𝑢(?̅?𝑅) = 𝑢(?̅?3) = 𝑢(−0.0526)  








0 −1 +1 
𝑥 
+35 














 In reality, people not only play roulette, but they bet on single numbers much more 
than they bet on red. The Friedman-Savage assumption of increasing marginal utility can 
again explain this phenomenon, but our theory again offers an alternative.  
 Applying our condition (9), DM will prefer playing the bet on red to not playing at 
all when  







and DM will prefer betting on a single number to not playing at all when  







 Neither condition (17) nor (18) can hold if there is very little ambiguity (𝜆 near 0),  
nor if the degree of ambiguity tolerance is very small (𝛼 near zero).    Thus, similar to the 
lottery case, our theory predicts that those who play roulette will be those who are more 
optimistic (𝛼 large enough) or perceive more ambiguity (𝜆 large enough), but even more 
so a combination of the two.   For a given level of ambiguity, condition (18) will hold 
with a lower level of optimism 𝛼 than condition (17). The valuation of the single number 
bet will therefore be higher.  That is, if playing roulette is attractive for DM, the single 
number bet will be more attractive.    
Application 3:  Why a Risk Averse Decision Maker May Exhibit Loss Aversion Yet 
Still Buy Insurance 
 
 Suppose DM faces the chance of losing an amount of wealth equal to 𝑎, or a 
possible change in wealth of  – 𝑎.  Suppose the probability of experiencing no loss is 𝑝, 
so the probability of experiencing the loss is 1 − 𝑝. Without insurance, the expected 





(19) ?̅? = 𝑝[0] + [1 − 𝑝][−𝑎] = −𝑎[1 − 𝑝] < 0 
The expected utility of DM is  
(20) 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] = 𝑝𝑢(0) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(−𝑎)  
 Figure 6 presents the standard explanation of how DM would value the loss in 
wealth relative to the purchase of insurance protection when there is no ambiguity.  The 
diminishing marginal utility assumption (or the concavity of the utility function) 
implies 𝑢(?̅?) >  𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)], so DM always prefers certainty and is willing to buy insurance 
in order to avoid the loss in wealth. Moreover, as shown in Figure 6, there exists a 
certainty equivalent ?̂? such that DM perceives the expected loss −𝑎[1 − 𝑝] provides the 
same level of satisfaction as the certain payment ?̂?. That is, by accepting the smaller 
certain change in wealth −?̂?, DM can avoid the risk of experiencing the larger change in 
wealth −𝑎.  The distance between −𝑎[1 − 𝑝] and ?̂? is the “premium”, or the maximum 
amount DM is willing to pay for insurance against the loss. 














 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] = 𝑝𝑢(0) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(−𝑎)
=  
𝑢(?̅?) = 𝑢(−𝛼[1 − 𝑝])  
𝑥 
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Our theory offers an explanation for why this risk averse decision maker may 
nonetheless choose to take the chance and self-insure.  If DM takes the chance rather than 
accepting the sure loss of the expected outcome ?̅? = −α[1 − p], then DM is exhibiting 
loss aversion.    Thus, our theory offers an explanation of loss aversion that does not 
depend upon an increasing marginal utility of wealth.    
 Using condition (9), DM prefers taking the chance when 𝑉(𝑥) > 𝑢(?̅?), or when  




The risk aversion assumption implies condition (21) will not hold if there is no ambiguity 
(𝜆 = 0).  When there is some ambiguity (𝜆 > 0), the risk aversion assumption also 
implies condition (21) cannot hold if the degree of ambiguity tolerance 𝛼 is small.  In 
particular, condition (21) cannot hold if 𝛼 < 𝑝. In the typical insurance situation, the 
probability 𝑝 of not incurring the loss is large, so 𝛼 < 𝑝 would be typical. Thus, our 
theory indicates DM would buy insurance in the typical situation where insurance is 
offered, for DM would have to be very optimistic (𝛼 near 1) to take the chance and not 
buy insurance.    
 Alternatively, DM will prefer to take the chance of losing the amount of wealth 𝑎 
when the probability 𝑝 is small enough.  We know of no other theory which can 
distinguish when the same person would buy insurance versus exhibit loss aversion and 
take the chance in a potential loss situation.  Our theory does.  With the degree of 
ambiguity determined by the situation and the degree of ambiguity tolerance determined 





situation when DM will want to buy insurance and mitigate risk from the situation when 
DM will be loss averse.   Proposition 4 indicates loss aversion will not occur when the 
probability of loss is high, unless there is much ambiguity and much ambiguity tolerance.  
DM will want to buy insurance in such situations.    More people will exhibit loss 
aversion when the probability 1 − 𝑝 of the loss is high, or when the probability of no loss 
is low.    A higher stake will also tweak DM away from buying insurance and toward loss 
aversion 
 Given our theory, it is interestingly to revisit the now famous loss aversion example 
of Kahneman and Tversky (1981):  
Problem 1: Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of 
an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. 
Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows: 
If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people 
will be saved and a 2/3 probability that nobody will be saved. 
Which of the two programs would you favor? 
 A substantial majority of subjects (72% of 152 subjects) chose program A. That is, 
subjects overwhelmingly exhibited risk aversion in this “gain frame,” finding it more 
attractive to save 200 people with certainty than facing the risky prospect with an 
expected value equal to 200.  For comparison, Kahneman and Tversky asked another 






Problem 2: Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of 
an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. 
Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows: 
 
If program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If program D is adopted, there is a one-1/3 probability that nobody 
will die and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. 
Which of the two programs would you favor? 
 A substantial majority of subjects (78% of 155 subjects) chose program D.  That 
is, subjects overwhelmingly exhibited risk seeking behavior in the loss frame.   
Analogous to the Friedman-Savage explanation for gambling behavior, the Kahneman-
Tversky explanation for loss aversion is that the marginal utility of income is increasing 
in the domain where outcomes are negative.   Our theory offers an alternative 
explanation. 
 Using our notation, 𝑝 = 1/3 in the Kahneman-Tversky loss and gain frame 
examples.    For the loss frame, this implies a 2/3 probability of loss, much higher than 
the typical insurance situation.   In our model, this relatively low choice for 𝑝 creates 
more potential for satisfying the 𝛼 > 𝑝 condition of Proposition 2, which is necessary 
for chance taking.    For subjects with 𝛼 > 𝑝, our theory would indicate that the high 
stake of lost lives would further motivate chance taking, which in the loss frame would 
be loss aversion.   
 To illustrate the difference the probability and stake can make, suppose we 





stake from 600 lives to a $600,000 home.  The Kahneman-Tversky choice A would then 
become accept $597,000 with certainty.  Choice B would become a lottery with a 
995/1000 chance of receiving a $600,000 home and 5/1000 chance of receiving nothing.     
One would expect a substantial majority to select the certain choice A, as in the original 
Kahneman-Tversky experiment.  Choice C would become losing $3,000 for sure (e.g., a 
“fair insurance  premium), and choice D would become a lottery with a 995/1000 chance 
of losing nothing and a 5/1000 chance of losing the $600,000 home.  The fact that so 
many chose to buy insurance in such situations is evidence that the loss aversion 
exhibited in the original Kahneman-Tversky experiment would NOT be exhibited. 
 Our model is challenged by the Kahneman-Tversky example in one interesting 
respect.  With fixed values for 𝜆 and 𝛼, and single concave utility function like the 
isoelastic utility function, if DM is risk averse (risk seeking) in gains then DM will also 
be risk averse (risk seeking) in losses for the same value of 𝑝.  That is, for our model to 
explain why DM might take a chance in a loss frame but not in a gain frame, with the 
utility function maintaining its concavity, 𝜆 or 𝛼 must vary across the frames.  While it 
is conceivable that DM could perceive more ambiguity in a loss frame than in the gain 
frame, it is more reasonable that the degree of optimism 𝛼 might vary.   Specifically, 
losses will loom larger than gains if DM is more optimistic (𝛼 larger) in the loss frame 
than in the gain frame.    
 To summarize, our theory suggests people will more likely exhibit loss aversion 
when the likelihood of loss is high but prefer buying insurance with the probability of 





tolerance (optimism) accentuate this expectation.   The same decision maker may 
rationally take chances in a loss frame but prefer certainty in a gain frame when potential 
losses make the decision maker more optimistic (“I will be one of the lucky ones”) than 
potential gains. 
Application 4:  An Alternative Explanation of the Equity Premium Puzzle 
Consider two investment opportunities, a stock share and a bond. If DM invests a 
particular amount in the stock, say $100, the probability of receiving the return  𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 is 𝑝 
and the probability of receiving no return is 1 − 𝑝. The expected return of the stock is 
therefore 
(22) ?̅? = 𝑝 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝](0) = 𝑝 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥,  
while the expected utility is 
(23) 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] =  𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(0).   
Assume DM can alternatively receive the outcome 𝑥bond with certainty by investing 
the same amount in the bond.    
The assumption of risk aversion implies the utility of the expected value of the 
stock is strictly greater than the expected utility; i.e., 𝑢(?̅?) > 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)].   Thus, DM will 
not invest in the stock unless the expected outcome ?̅? is more than the certain outcome 
𝑥bond.  If the entire market consists of investors identical to DM, then stock and bond 
investments can both occur only if 𝑢(𝑥bond) = 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)], so DM is indifferent between 
the two investments.    Thus, the relationship between 𝑥𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 and ?̅? must be as shown in 
Figure 7.   The difference ?̅? − 𝑥bond  is a measure of the equity premium received for 















The equity premium actually observed in reality is larger than we would 
reasonably expect risk aversion to explain.  According to Kocherlakota (1996), the 
estimated returns to investors from holding stocks were at 7% per year while the 
estimated returns from the U.S government bonds were at only one percent per year. 
Moreover, this phenomenon is regularly observed in every market around the globe. This 
unexpectedly large equity premium implies an inability of the risk aversion to reflect a 
realistic level of risk preferences among investors, and the challenge associated with 
explaining why the equity premium is so high is referred to as the “equity premium 
puzzle.”    
Several possible explanations to the equity premium puzzle have been proposed 
in economics and finance literature.“Loss aversion” seems to be the most widely 
recognized approach to rationalize the underlying behavior behind the puzzlingly large 
discrepancy between the returns of stocks and the fixed returns of bonds. A greater 














standard expected utility theory, and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently also 
offers an explanation (Bernatzi and Thaler, 1995; Rabin and Thaler, 2001).  Here, our 
theory offers an alternative explanation for why the equity premium might be larger than 
the amount ?̅? − 𝑥bond shown in Figure 7.     
When there is ambiguity (𝜆 > 0), condition (8) implies 𝑉(𝑥) < 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] when 
𝜆[𝛼 − 𝑝][𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(0)] < 0.   Because companies issuing stock attract investment, it 
is reasonable to think that the anchor probability 𝑝 is not extremely low, but rather might 
well be high.   Consequently, for many decision-makers, even relatively optimistic 
decision makers, the probability 𝑝 might well be high enough that 𝛼 < 𝑝.    If  𝛼 < 𝑝, 
then 𝑉(𝑥) < 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)].    For DM to be indifferent between a stock investment with an 




) would have to hold, and 𝑉(𝑥) < 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] implies the equity 
premium ?̅? − 𝑥bond
ambiguity must be greater than the equity premium ?̅? − 𝑥bond.    
When 𝛼 < 𝑝, more ambiguity (𝜆 larger) and a higher stake (𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) is larger) 
will increase the difference 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] − 𝑉(𝑥).   This would increase the equity premium 
needed to keep the uncertain stock investment equivalent to the certain bond investment.  
Thus, our theory indicates an exceptionally large premium would be expected when the 






To be more precise, since xbond
ambiguity is defined by V(x) = u(xbond
ambiguity
) and 
xbond is defined by 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] = 𝑢(𝑥bond), it follows that 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] − 𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑢(𝑥bond) −
u(xbond
ambiguity
).   Eliminating 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] − 𝑉(𝑥), we find 
(24)  𝜆[𝑝 − 𝛼][𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] = 𝑢(𝑥bond) − u(xbond
ambiguity
).    
When 𝛼 < 𝑝, as hypothesized, each side of (24) is positive, which implies 
xbond
ambiguity<𝑥bond.    
When we hold 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛, and 𝑝 fixed, the value of 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] is fixed, so the value of 
𝑥bond is also fixed.  T   Holding 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛, and 𝑝 fixed, we can therefore use (24) to 
examine how xbond
ambiguity changes when we change the degree of ambiguity 𝜆 and the 




























− 𝑥bond is a measure of the degree to which the equity 
premium exceeds that expected from risk aversion alone.  Conditions (25) and (26) 
indicate that more ambiguity and less ambiguity tolerance each increase the equity 






5. Conclusion  
The distinction between risk and ambiguity has been recognized since Knight 
(1921) and Keynes (1921).  Ellsberg’s (1961) seminal experiment demonstrated that the 
presence of ambiguity can systematically impact decision behavior.  However, ambiguity 
has not been used to explain the puzzling behaviors of decision making under uncertainty 
as much as it might.  This paper has sought to contribute in this regard.     
 We have illustrated the potential explanatory power of ambiguity.  It can explain 
why the same person may rationally buy insurance and gamble.  It can explain why some 
people will gamble and others will not.  It can explain why a gambler may rationally 
prefer a higher variance bet to a lower variance bet.  It can explain why a risk averse 
decision-maker may rationally exhibit loss aversion.   It can explain why losses may 
loom larger than gains to a decision maker.  It can explain the equity premium puzzle.  
In his Noble lecture, Maurice Allais (1990) emphasizes the importance of 
developing theories with testable implications, and our theory offers a number of these.  
First, there is more scope for ambiguity to motivate chance taking by risk-averse decision 
makers when (1) the bad outcome is very likely and the good outcome is not, and (2) the 
decision maker is more optimistic.  More ambiguity or larger stakes will either reinforce 
risk aversion not taking a chance (when the decision maker is not optimistic enough) or 
offset the risk aversion and motivate taking a chance (when the decision maker is 
optimistic enough).   Designing experiments to test and explore these hypotheses will be 






      It seems especially challenging, but also important, to distinguish our theory from 
the theory that utility function convexity (or a preference for risk seeking) explains 
chance taking.  For example, our theory indicates people often prefer betting on single 
numbers in roulette more than betting on a color because the lower probability 𝑝 of 
winning the single number bet requires a lower level of optimism to make taking a 
chance worthwhile under ambiguity.  Utility convexity indicates the single number bet is 
preferred because the win is more life changing.   Which is correct?   
 If our theory is empirically validated, it would restore the historically comfortable 
assumption that the marginal utility of wealth is decreasing over all wealth levels for the 
typical person.   Alternatively, if further empirical research validates the existence of 
segments risk seeking behavior in particular contexts, we will better understand those 
contexts, including investing, gambling, and loss aversion.    
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Proof of Proposition 1: With two possible outcome 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥, the difference 
between the valuation of the minimax expected utility 𝑉(𝑥) given by (7) and the expected 
utility of the certain outcome 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] given by (3) is  
𝑉(𝑥) − 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] =  [1 − 𝜆][𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] + 𝜆[𝛼𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) +
[1 − 𝛼]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] −  [𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]  
Or, equivalently,  
𝑉(𝑥) − 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)]
= [𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] − 𝜆[𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
+ 𝜆[𝛼𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝛼]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] − [𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] 
Which produces 
𝑉(𝑥) − 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] =  −𝜆[𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] + 𝜆[𝛼𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝛼]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] 
Factoring out 𝜆 and 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) yields 
𝑉(𝑥) − 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)] =  𝜆[𝛼 − 𝑝][𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] 
















Proof Proposition 3 
𝑉(𝑥) −  𝑢(?̅?) = [1 − 𝜆][𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
+ 𝜆[𝛼𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝛼]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] − 𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
= [𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] − 𝜆[𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
+ 𝜆[𝛼𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝛼]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] −  𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
= 𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − 𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − 𝜆𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝜆𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) + 𝜆𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
+ 𝜆 𝛼𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + 𝜆𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − 𝜆𝛼𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) −  𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
= 𝑝[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] − 𝜆𝑝[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] + 𝜆𝛼[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
− 𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
= [𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)][𝜆𝛼 + 𝑝 − 𝜆𝑝] −  𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
= [𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] [[𝜆𝛼 + [1 − 𝜆]𝑝] −
𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
] 
= [𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] [𝜆[𝛼 − 𝑝] +
𝑝[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] − 𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) + 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
] 
= [𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] [𝜆[𝛼 − 𝑝] +
𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − 𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
] 
= [𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] [𝜆[𝛼 − 𝑝] −
𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − [𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
] 

















Proof Proposition 4: If there is some ambiguity (i.e.,  𝜆 > 0), and if DM has some 
ambiguity tolerance (i.e.,  𝛼 > 0), then 𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑢(?̅?) implies  
𝜆[𝛼 − 𝑝] −  
𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − [𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
= 0 
Let 𝑓(𝑝) denote a differentiable function of the probability 𝑝 of the good outcome 













) 𝑢(?̅?).  
To characterize the shape of 𝑓(𝑝) function, we first derive the value of 𝑓(𝑝) function 
evaluated at 𝑝 = 0 and 𝑝 = 1  respectively.   
When 𝑝 = 0, then 𝑓(0) = 𝜆𝛼 −
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)−[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥)−𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
= 𝜆𝛼 > 0 
When 𝑝 = 1, then 𝑓(1) = 𝜆[𝛼 − 1] −
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥)−[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥)]
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥)−𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
= 𝜆[𝛼 − 1] < 0 
 Since 𝑓(𝑝) = 𝜆𝛼 at 𝑝 = 0 is strictly greater than 𝑓(𝑝) = 𝜆[𝛼 − 1] at 𝑝 = 1, the 
𝑓(𝑝) may possibly be a decreasing function in 𝑝. To verify this, we then perform the first 
derivative 𝑓′(𝑝) to measure the rate of change of the function, and the second derivative 







= 𝑓′(?̅?) =  −𝜆 − [
𝑢′(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)[𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛] − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
] 
=  −𝜆 −






= [1 − 𝜆] −
𝑢′(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)[𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛]
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
 
= [1 − 𝜆] −




Then, evaluating 𝑓′(?̅?) at 𝑝 = 0 and 𝑝 = 1 yields 












> 1, 𝑓′(0) then is strictly negative.  





The slope of 𝑓(𝑝) evaluate at 𝑝 = 1 indicates 𝑓(𝑝) is monotonically increasing in 𝑝 if  




. Then, the second derivative implies   
𝑑2𝑓(𝑝)
𝑑𝑝2
= 𝑓′′(?̅?) = −









sign of the second derivative is strictly positive.  Therefore, we conclude that the function 
𝑓(𝑝) is monotonically decreasing at increasing rate as the probability 𝑝 of the good 
outcome increases.  
The plot of 𝑓(𝑝) function against 𝑝 is provided below. 
 




Finally, we then perform comparative statics to examine the impact of changing in 
ambiguity 𝜆 and ambiguity tolerance 𝛼 on the unique likelihood of ?̅?. Allowing ?̅?, 𝜆, and 
𝛼 to change, the total differential of the function 𝑓(𝑝) = 0 can be written as 
[𝛼 − ?̅?]𝑑𝜆 + 𝜆𝑑𝛼 − 𝜆𝑑?̅? − [
𝑢′(?̅?𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − ?̅?]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)[[𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛] − [𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
] 𝑑?̅? = 0 
[𝛼 − ?̅?]𝑑𝜆 + 𝜆𝑑𝛼 − 𝜆𝑑?̅? − [





] 𝑑?̅? = 0 
[𝛼 − ?̅?]𝑑𝜆 + 𝜆𝑑𝛼 − 𝜆𝑑?̅? + [−
𝑢′(?̅?𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − ?̅?]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)[[𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛]
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
+ 1] 𝑑?̅? = 0 
[[1 − 𝜆] − −
𝑢′(?̅?𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − ?̅?]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)[[𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛]
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
] 𝑑?̅? = −[𝛼 − ?̅?]𝑑𝜆 − 𝜆𝑑𝛼 














𝑑?̅? =  
−[𝛼 − ?̅?]
[[1 − 𝜆] −






[[1 − 𝜆] −




Knowing the first derivative 𝑓′(?̅?) = [1 − 𝜆] −
𝑢′(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥+[1−𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)[𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛]
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥)−𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
< 0, the 




> 0) and in ambiguity tolerance (
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝛼
> 0).  
 To illustrate how the three parameters 𝑝, 𝜆, and 𝛼 affect the willingness of DM to 
take the chance, we plot the two functional terms within the 𝑓(𝑝) function as they depend 
upon the probability 𝑝 of the good outcome. 
𝑓(𝑝) = 𝜆[𝛼 − 𝑝] −  
𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − [𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
 
The linear term 𝜆[𝛼 − 𝑝] implies the intercept 𝜆𝛼 when 𝑝 = 0 and the slope of – 𝜆 when 










= 0   






= 0   
As the curvature function takes the value of zero when 𝑝 = 0 and when 𝑝 = 1, 





with respect to 𝑝 and set it up equal zero to identify the condition, where the function will 




𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − [𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
] = 0 




𝑢′(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)[𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛]
[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
− 1 = 0 
𝑢′(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)[𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛]
[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
= 1 




This condition implies there must exist the maximum at the point where the slope of the 
utility  of the expected value 𝑢(?̅?) equal the slope of the expected utility 𝐸[𝑢(𝑥)]. This 








𝑢′(?̂?𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − ?̂?]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)] 





Finally, the plot of the two functional terms within 𝑓(𝑝) in condition (9) can be shown as 









Proof of an Application of Fair Lottery with 𝑁 participants: To examine whether the 
minimax expected utility V is greater than the utility of the expected value, we construct 
𝑉 − 𝑢(?̅?) > 0, which implies  
[1 − 𝜆] [[
1
𝑁
] 𝑢(𝑁 − 1) + [
𝑁 − 1
𝑁












] 𝑢(𝑁 − 1) + [
𝑁 − 1
𝑁
] 𝑢(−1)] −  𝜆 [[
1
𝑁




+ 𝜆[𝛼[𝑢(𝑁 − 1)] + [1 − 𝛼][𝑢(−1)]] > 𝑢 (
1
𝑁







𝜆𝛼 + [1 − 𝜆]𝑝 
1 
𝑝 
𝑢(𝑝𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝]𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) − [𝑝𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
[𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)]
 















] 𝑢(𝑁 − 1) + 𝑢(−1) − [
1
𝑁
] 𝑢(−1) − 𝜆 [
1
𝑁




+ 𝜆𝛼𝑢(𝑁 − 1) + 𝜆[𝑢(−1)] − 𝜆𝛼[𝑢(−1)] > 𝑢 (
1
𝑁




Subtracting both sides by 𝑢(−1) and rearranging the equation yields 
1
𝑁
[𝑢(𝑁 − 1) − 𝑢(−1)] − 𝜆 [
1
𝑁




[𝑁 − 1] +
𝑁 − 1
𝑁
[−1]) − 𝑢(−1) 
Factoring out [𝑢(𝑁 − 1) − 𝑢(−1)] on the left side yields 
[𝑢(𝑁 − 1) − 𝑢(−1)] [𝜆𝛼 + [1 − 𝜆]
1
𝑁
] >  𝑢 (
1
𝑁
[𝑁 − 1] +
𝑁 − 1
𝑁
[−1]) − 𝑢(−1) 
Dividing both sides of the equation by [𝑢(𝑁 − 1) − 𝑢(−1)] yields 
















[𝑁 − 1] +
𝑁−1
𝑁
[−1] = 0, we get 













Proof of an Application of a Roulette Wheel: For $1 bet on red, the expected value of the 











To examine whether the minimax expected utility is greater than the utility of not playing 
the roulette, we then construct 𝑉 − 𝑢(0) > 0: 

















𝑢(+1) + [1 −
18
38
] 𝑢(−1)] − 𝜆 [
18
38




+ 𝜆[𝛼𝑢(+1) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(−1)] > 𝑢(0) 
Or, equivalently,  
18
38










+ 𝜆𝑢(−1) − 𝜆𝛼𝑢(−1) > 𝑢(0) 
Subtracting both sides by 𝑢(−1) and rearranging the equation yields 
18
38
[𝑢(+1) − 𝑢(−1)] − 𝜆
18
38
[𝑢(+1) − 𝑢(−1)] + 𝜆𝛼[𝑢(+1) − 𝑢(−1)]
> 𝑢(0) − 𝑢(−1) 





[𝑢(+1) − 𝑢(−1)] [𝜆𝛼 + [1 − 𝜆]
18
38
] > 𝑢(0) − 𝑢(−1)  
Dividing both sides of the equation by 𝑢(+1) − 𝑢(−1) yields 

















−0.0526, we can proceed in a similar manner to derive the condition 𝑉 − 𝑢(0). This 
condition is given by 







Proof of an Application of Buying Insurance 
Given the expected value of the loss is ?̅? = 𝑝[0] + [1 − 𝑝][−𝑎] = −𝑎[1 − 𝑝] < 0, we 
then construct 𝑉(𝑥) − 𝑢(?̅?), which implies  
(1 − 𝜆)[𝑝𝑢(0) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(−𝛼)] + 𝜆[𝛼𝑢(+1) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(−𝑎)] > 𝑢(−𝑎[1 − 𝑝]) 
This condition can be written as 
𝑝𝑢(0) + 𝑢(−𝛼) − 𝑝𝑢(−𝛼) − 𝜆𝑝𝑢(0) − 𝜆𝑢(−𝛼) + 𝜆𝑝𝑢(−𝛼) + 𝜆𝛼𝑢(+1) + 𝜆𝑢(−𝑎)
− 𝜆𝛼𝑢(−𝑎) > 𝑢(−𝑎[1 − 𝑝]) 
Subtracting both sides by 𝑢(−𝛼) and rearranging the left side of the equation yields 
𝑝[𝑢(0) − 𝑢(−𝛼)] − 𝜆𝑝[𝑢(0) − 𝑢(−𝛼)] + 𝜆𝛼[𝑢(0) − 𝑢(−𝛼)]





Factoring out 𝑢(0) − 𝑢(−𝛼) on the left side yields 
[𝑢(0) − 𝑢(−𝛼)][𝜆𝛼 + [1 − 𝜆]𝑝] = 𝑢(−𝑎[1 − 𝑝]) − 𝑢(−𝛼) 
Dividing both sides of the equation yields 
𝜆𝛼 + [1 − 𝜆]𝑝 =  
𝑢(−𝑎[1 − 𝑝]) − 𝑢(−𝛼)
𝑢(0) − 𝑢(−𝛼)
 
Proof of an Application for the Equity Premium Puzzle 
Given the expected return from the stock is ?̅? = 𝑝 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 + [1 − 𝑝](0) and the expected utility 
of the stock 𝐸[𝑢(?̅?)] is equivalent to the utility of the expected  return from holding the bond 
𝑢(𝑥𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑), we then construct 𝑉(𝑥) − 𝐸[𝑢(?̅?)] = 0: 
(1 − 𝜆)[𝑝𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(0)] + 𝜆[𝛼𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(0)]
= 𝑝 𝑢(𝑥
𝑚𝑎𝑥
) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(0) 
This can be written as 
𝑝𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(0) − 𝜆[𝑝𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(0)] + 𝜆[𝛼𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(0)]
= 𝑝 𝑢(𝑥
𝑚𝑎𝑥
) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(0) 
Subtracting both side of the equation by 𝑝𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(0) yields 
−𝜆[𝑝𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + [1 − 𝑝]𝑢(0)] + 𝜆[𝛼𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(0)] = 0 
This condition can also be written as  





Rearranging this equation, we have 
−𝜆𝑝[𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(0)] + 𝜆𝛼[𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(0)] = 0 
Factoring out 𝑢( 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) − 𝑢(0) and 𝜆 on the left side yields 
















































The paper experimentally examines the effects of punishment, communication 
and the interaction of these on trust and trustworthiness. Consistent with 
previous works, trusting and trustworthy behaviors are observed across all 
different treatments, and subjects are not motivated solely by self-interest. The 
presence of either the punishment option or the communication option crowds 
out trustworthiness which trust can elicit, or reduces the marginal effect of trust. 
However, if trustor expresses the highest level of trust accompanied by 
communication without implementing any punishment threat, the trustee’s 





























Concerns about trust have grown substantially during the last two decades, as the 
development of trust helps people to establish productive and meaningful relationships. 
In business and economics, “trust always affects two outcomes: speed and cost. When 
trust goes down, speed goes down and cost goes up” (Covey, 2006, p.22). There is a great 
deal of supporting evidence that trust fosters business and economic activities by 
lowering monitoring costs (e.g. Frank, 1988), lowering turnover (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), 
enhancing economic outcomes (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993), and improving the 
overall economy (Knack & Keefer, 1997). Not surprisingly, such observations have led 
many economists to examine the determinants of trust, especially in the experimental 
setting.  
Beginning with Berg et al.’s (1995) study of trust and reciprocity, the trust game 
has become a popular tool in measuring trust and trustworthiness in both controlled 
laboratories and filed experiments (e.g., Barr, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000; Cochard, 
Nguyen and Willinger, 2004 Willinger, Keser, Lohmann and Usunier, 2003; Coricelli, 
Morales and Mahlstedt, 2006; Bacharach, Guerra and Zizzo, 2007; Bellemare and 
Kroger, 2007; Bigoni, Bortolotti, Casari, Gambetta and Pancotto, 2013). Recently, a body 
of economic literature on this topic has focused on understanding the extent to which 
punishment and communication affect trust and trustworthiness (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 
2000; Bohnet et al., 2001: Fehr and List 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; 





The ability to punish and the ability to communicate may alter players’ beliefs 
and actions. The effectiveness of each mechanism is also dependent upon several factors 
such as the cost of punishment (Rigdon, 2009), the number of participants (Bohnet et al., 
2001; Charness et al., 2008), and the form of communication (Issac and Walker, 1998; 
Duffy and Feltovich, 2002). However, these studies have examined either punishment or 
communication, but not both, meaning one must speculate about how they interact. To 
date, no trust game experiment has offered a comprehensive design, in which subjects are 
allowed to have both the ability to punish and the ability to communicate. 
 Another aspect of the trust game experiment that has been absent in the literature 
is the possibility of having one-way communication beginning from the trustor. Previous 
experiments have examined one-way communication beginning from trustee (e.g., Bracht 
and Feltovich, 2009), and two-way communication where subjects have the opportunity 
to dialogue before making decisions (e.g., Issac and Walker, 1998; Duffy and Feltovich 
2002).  
This study makes two important contributions. First, the study sheds light on how 
punishment and communication interact in terms of impacting trust and trustworthiness. 
Subjects in the role of trustor are randomly assigned into one of the four conditions: 
punish only, communicate only, punish or communicate, and neither. By looking at 
punishment and communication separately and jointly, we can identify any interaction 
effect. Second, this study broadens the literature and offers a new experimental design 





The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 specifies our 
experimental design, our subject pool, and the details of the experimental parameters and 
procedures. Section 3 provides the predictions of self-interest, related evidence from 
previous studies, and tests of the self-interest hypothesis using data from our study. 
Section 4 presents and analyzes the data from our four experimental treatments, focusing 
on understanding the effects of punishment and communication. Section 5 summarizes 
and concludes the paper. 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
The experiment contains four treatments and uses a 2 x 2 design, as presented in 
Table 1.  The NPNC treatment is the standard trust game, which offers neither the ability 
to punish nor the ability to communicate. NPNC provides a baseline measure of trust and 
trustworthiness, a control against which the following three treatments can be compared. 
In the WPNC treatment, Actor 1 may punish Actor 2 in the trust game for not providing 
the desired back transfer, but Actor 1 does not have the ability to communicate a written 
message to Actor 2.   Conversely, in the NPWC treatment, Actor 1 may communicate a 
written message to Actor 2 but cannot punish Actor 2.  The WPNC and NPWC 
treatments provide baselines against which the results of the WPWC treatment can be 
compared.  In the WPWC treatment, Actor 1 has both the ability to communicate a 







Table1: Experimental Treatments 
  No Ability to Communicate Ability to Communicate 
No Ability to Punish NPNC NPWC 
Ability to Punish WPNC WPWC 
 
 By comparing the results of the WPWC treatment to those of the other three 
treatments, we can examine how punishment and communication interact.  It could be 
that they complement each other, so that having both options facilitates trust, or 
trustworthiness, or both.  However, many other outcomes are possible.  For example, it 
could be that taking advantage of the ability to punish cancels out a positive effect of an 
ability to communicate.  The treatments are now described in more detail.   
In the NPNC treatment, Actor 1 and Actor 2 are paired and play a standard trust 
game. Paired participants are in different rooms, and understand their identity is never 
revealed to the other.  Actor 1 and Actor 2 each receive an endowment of 10 shanks 
(experimental currency units).   By writing on a decision sheet, Actor 1 choses a transfer 
amount  𝑥 ∈  {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10}  shanks to send to Actor 2 and indicates a desired back-
transfer ?̂?  ∈  {0, 1, 2, . . . , 3𝑥}. The decision sheet is then taken to the other room and 
given to Actor 2.  Actor 2 receives 3 shanks for each shank transferred by Actor 1.  Then, 
Actor 2 choses the actual back-transfer level 𝑦 ∈  {0, 1, 2, . . . , 3𝑥}.  The payoff received 
by Actor 1 is given by  𝜋1 = 10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦, whereas the payoff for Actor 2 is 𝜋2 = 10 +
3𝑥 − 𝑦.   Each participant was paid two U.S. dollars for each shank earned (See 





      The WPNC treatment is identical to the NPNC treatment, except Actor 1 in the 
WPNC treatment can implement a “conditional payoff cut.”   The conditional payoff cut 
is a fixed penalty of 4 shanks (𝑓 = 4) imposed on Actor 2 whenever the actual back 
transfer paid by Actor 2 is less than the desired back transfer of Actor 1 (i.e., whenever 
𝑦 < ?̂?).   Importantly, Actor 1 is not required to implement the punishment, and the 4 
shanks penalty is not given to the Actor 1 when Actor 1 does not implement the 
punishment. Actor 2 is aware that Actor 1 may or may not impose the conditional payoff 
cut.  Prior to making the back transfer choice, Actor 2 is informed on the decision sheet 
whether or not Actor 1 has chosen to implement this conditional payoff cut.  As in the 
NPNC treatment, the Actor 1’s payoff is given by 𝜋1 = 10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦.  For Actor 2, the 
payoff is 𝜋2 = 10 + 3𝑥 − 𝑦 as in the NPNC treatment if either Actor 1 does not impose 
the conditional payoff cut or Actor 2 provides a back transfer that is greater than or equal 
to the desired back transfer of Actor 1 (i.e.,  if 𝑦 ≥  ?̂?).  Alternatively, the payoff for 
Actor 2 is    𝜋2 = 10 + 3𝑥 − 𝑦 − 4  if Actor 1 imposes the conditional payoff cut and 
Actor 2 fails to provide the actual back transfer that is greater than or equal to the desired 
back-transfer requested by Actor 1 (i.e.,  if  𝑦 < ?̂?).   
      The NPWC is identical to the NPNC treatment except Actor 1 could provide a 
written message to Actor 2 prior to submitting the transfer choice.  Importantly, Actor 2 
is not allowed to provide a message back to Actor 1, so the communication is one-way. 
Actor 1 completes a decision sheet as in the NPNC control treatment, but the decision 
sheet in the NPWC treatment has a box indicating either “yes” if Actor1 chooses to 





communicate, the message is typed into a computer and sent through a computer network 
to the computer in front of Actor 2 in the other room. Once Actor 2 receives the decision 
sheet, if the decision sheet indicates there is a message, then Actor 2 must view the 
message sent through the computer network prior to deciding upon the actual back 
transfer.   Regardless of whether a message is sent, the Actor 1’s payoff is given by 𝜋1 =
10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦 and the Actor 2’s payoff is given by 𝜋2 = 10 + 3𝑥 − 𝑦.   That is, the only 
difference between the control treatment NPNC and the communication treatment NPWC 
is Actor 1 may communicate with Actor 2 by a written message.   
     The treatment WPWC combines the WPNC treatment with the NPWC treatment.  
Actor 1 has the ability to punish Actor 2 for not satisfying his desired back-transfer, and 
Actor 1 can communicate a message to Actor 2.  Similar to other treatments, the payoff to 
Actor 1 is given by 𝜋1 = 10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦.    Since communication through a message sent by 
Actor 1 has no effect on Actor 2’s payoff, the payoff for Actor 2 in this treatment is 
determined exclusively by whether or not the conditional payoff cut is imposed.  Hence, 
the Actor 2’s payoff is 𝜋2 = 10 + 3𝑥 − 𝑦 − 4  if the Actor1 imposes the conditional 
payoff cut and if Actor 2 choses back transfer 𝑦 < ?̂?, while the payoff to Actor 2 is 𝜋2 =
10 + 3𝑥 − 𝑦 if either Actor 1 chooses not to impose the conditional payoff cut or if Actor 
1 imposes the punishment but Actor 2 choses back transfer 𝑦 ≥  ?̂?.   
     The experimental data was collected in a series of 10 sessions, where each session 
randomly assign subjects into different treatments.  A total of 260 subjects (130 pairs) 
participated in the four treatments including 50 subjects (25 pairs) in treatment NPNC, 78 





subjects (40 pairs) in treatment WPWC. This included undergraduate students, graduate 
students, and employees at University of Nevada, Reno. Upon agreeing to participate in 
the study, subjects completed a demographic questionnaire mainly for the purpose of 
controlling for individual heterogeneity in our econometric analysis (See Appendix B).  
  In addition, specific efforts were taken to recruit employees and students with 
supervisory experience, so the behavior of those with supervisory experience could also 
be compared to the behavior of those without supervisory experience.  Defining a 
supervisory position as one in which the work of at least one other employee was 
supervised, there were 128 subjects in supervisory position and 132 subjects in non-
supervisory position. However, our results obtained from a variety of statistical tests 
(e.g., the one-tailed t-test, two-tailed t-test, and regression analysis) indicate no 
significant effects of supervisory experience and demographic factors (e.g., age, gender, 
income, education level, religious) on trusting and trustworthy behavior. 
3. Underlying Theory and Previous Research 
 
3.1 Null Hypotheses under Pure Self Interest 
 
The degree of trust in the experiment is captured by the willingness of Actor 1 to 
transfer a positive amount (0 < 𝑥 ≤ 10)  of initial endowment to Actor 2, and the degree 
of trustworthiness is the willingness of Actor 2 to back transfer some amount 
(0 < 𝑦 ≤ 3𝑥) of the tripled transfer.   An important theory of how people will behave is 
offered by the Nash equilibrium solution concept, which assumes each player is self-
interested and acts under the assumption all other players are also self-interested.     The 






H1: Actor 1 in the NPNC treatment will demonstrate no trust by choosing a transfer level 
of zero. 
If Actor 2 is purely self-interested, then Actor 2 will not provide any back 
transfer.  Anticipating this, Actor 1 will not transfer any value to Actor 2.  So, the Nash 
Equilibrium prediction is 𝑥 = 0, 𝑦 = 0.  The communication of Actor 2 in the form of the 
chosen value of ?̂? is cheap talk, for it has no bearing on the outcome of Actor 2, so the 
theory provides no prediction for the value of ?̂?.      
 H2:  The ability to impose a conditional payoff cut in the WPNC and WPWC treatments 
will be implemented, and the back transfer will be either 3 or 4 shanks.  
 
In the WPNC and WPWC treatments, Actor 1 has the opportunity to penalize 
Actor 2 by imposing the conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks whenever the actual back 
transfer is less than the desired back transfer. If both Actor 1 and Actor 2 are self-
interested, and if Actor 1 anticipates Actor 2’s self-interest, it is obvious that 
implementing the payoff cut is a dominant strategy for Actor 1, because it guarantees a 
higher payoff (𝑓 = 4 > 𝑓 = 0).  Knowing Actor 1’s dominant strategy, Actor 2’s best 
response can be either sending back the requested amount when the desired back transfer 
is less than or equal to 4 shanks, or sending back nothing when the desired back transfer 
is greater than 4 shanks. With the ability to recognize Actor 2’s best response, Actor 1 
should appropriately select a combination of the transfer and desired back transfer such 
that his payoff in the game is maximized. That is, Actor 1 will transfer 𝑥 = 1 and 
request ?̂? = 3, or transfer 𝑥 = 2 and request ?̂? = 4. Subsequently, there exists two 
equilibria in the game with punishment, including (𝑥 = 1, ?̂? = 3, 𝑦 = 3) and (𝑥 = 2, ?̂? =





H3:  In the NPWC and WPWC treatments, the opportunity of Actor 1 to communicate a 
message to Actor 2 prior to submitting a transfer choice will neither affect the transfer 
(trust) of Actor 1 nor the back transfer (trustworthiness) or Actor 2. 
The opportunity to communicate through a message is cheap talk.  Because it 
cannot impact Actor 2 in terms of the payoffs, it will not impact the decision of Actor 2.  
Thus, in the NPWC treatment, when no punishment option is available to Actor 1, Actor 
2 will chose a zero back transfer and Actor 1 will choose a zero transfer level. That is, the 
predictions for the NPWC treatment are the same as that for the NPNC treatment. 
H4:  When punishment and communication interact, subjects will not exhibit trust and 
trustworthiness differently from the case when the punishment option is available 
separately.  
 
The predictions for the WPWC treatment are the same as for the WPNC treatment, since 
the communication is cheap talk.     
3.2 Testing the Pure Self-Interest Hypotheses 
From previous research using the trust game, we expect the pure self-interest 
hypotheses to be rejected.  Table 2 summarizes the predictions of pure self-interest 
hypotheses, and Table 3 provides the mean behavior of subjects in our four experimental 
treatments.  As expected, all of the pure self-interest hypotheses are rejected. 
In the four treatments, the average transfer of Actor 1 ranges between 60 and 70 
percent the 10 shank endowment, and the average back transfer chosen by Actor 2 ranges 
between 7 and 12 shanks. The difference in the average transfer of Actor 1 across the 
treatment is not statistically significant, but the average back transfer of Actor 2 does 





Table 2: Pure Self-Interest Hypotheses 
 












transfer 𝒚 (shanks) 
NPNC 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 
WPN
C 1 100% 3 N/A 3 
 2 100% 4 N/A 4 
NPW
C 0 N/A 0 Indifferent 0 
WPW
C 1 100% 3 Indifferent 3 
 2 100% 4 Indifferent 4 
 
Table 3: Experimental Results 
 












transfer 𝒚 (shanks) 
NPNC 
N=24 7.00 N/A 14.91 N/A 11.95 
WPNC      
N=37 6.16 62% 12.67 N/A 7.11 
NPWC 
N=26 6.77 N/A 13.80 70% 9.07 
WPWC      
N=39 6.69 77% 13.79 85% 7.89 
 
The positive transfer in NPNC treatment (67.2% of the initial endowment) is 
consistent with the evidence gathered in previous studies. Berg et al. (1995), who 
introduced the trust game, found Actor 1 transferred an average of 52% of the 
endowment. Cox (2004) found that 80% of Actor 1 participants (26 out of 32 subjects) 
transferred positive amounts and averaged a transfer of 60% of the endowment. Bohet 
and Baytelman (2007) reported an average transfer of 55% of the endowment.1 Our 
NPNC treatment is unique in that no previous standard trust game required Actor 1 to 
                                                          
1 See. Camerer (2003), Sapienza, Simats, & Zingales, 2007, Cooper and Kagel (2009), Johnson and Mislin 
(2011), Eckel and Wilson (2010), and Eckel and Grossman (2008) for reviews of experimental results in 





provide a requested back transfer.   However, the results in the baseline NPNC treatment 
are consistent with previous results.   
Why do people exhibit significant trust, and not the pure self-interest behavior 
implicitly associated with the Nash equilibrium prediction?   The bulk of work in 
experimental economics suggests people exhibit “social preferences,” or a concern for the 
other.  One can classify preferences that depart from the self-interest into three 
categories: positive reciprocity (Ortmann, Fitzgerald & Boeing, 2000; McCabe, Rigdon, 
& Smith, 2003; Cox, 2004;), inequality aversion or fairness (Rabin, 1993; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 1999) and altruism (Cox, Sadiraj, & Sadiraj 2001; 
Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Carpenter, Connolly & Myers, 
2008).   Our purpose here is not to test one of these theories against the others, but rather 
is to obtain insight as to how communications and punishment options influence 
outcomes when social preferences are present. 
In Table 3, notice the desired back transfer of Actor 1 is roughly twice the amount 
sent, or roughly two-thirds the tripled amount received by Actor 2.  This implies the 
average Actor 1 participant is proposing to divide the surplus created by the trust 
exhibited by Actor 1 in such a manner that the ultimate payoffs of the two players are 
roughly equal.  This is an interesting result in that it helps us recognize Actor 1 can 
communicate with Actor 2, even when there is no opportunity to send a written message.  
A larger transfer amount 𝑥 communicates a greater level of trust, and the desired back 
transfer level ?̂? = 2𝑥 indicates a desire for fairness in the form of equal outcomes.   
Our result for the average desired back transfer is consistent with that obtained 





of punishment, reported that Actor 1 subjects requested 60 to 67 of the tripled investment 
as a back transfer. Similarly, Fehr and List (2004) reported the desired back transfer of 
roughly two-thirds the tripled investment. These have motivated researchers to use the 
desired back transfer as a means for understanding the motives and preferences of Actor 
1, including inequality aversion (Neaf & Schuup, 2009), positive reciprocity (Bicchieri et 
al., 2010), and guilt aversion (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007).  
As shown in Table 3, the average back transfer of Actor 2 in the baseline NPNC 
treatment is 11.88 shanks.  This is significantly higher (p < 0.05) than the average back 
transfers in the other treatments (9.07 in NPWC, 8.10 in WPNC, and 8.03 in WPWC) 
according to the one-tailed t-test.  In contrast to what one might expect, these results 
suggest the ability to punish and the ability to communicate each hamper the ability to 
elicit trustworthiness.    
 Why might the ability to punish a lack of trustworthiness actually reduce 
trustworthiness?  One explanation is positive reciprocity.  If people respond to trust by 
reciprocating with trustworthiness, then trust will elicit trustworthiness.  Threating 
punishment reduces or, as in the case of the Nash Equilibrium described above, entirely 
eliminates trust from the human interaction, and thereby reduces or eliminates the ability 
of trust to elicit trustworthiness.   
 Refraining from implementing punishment when the option is available might be 
perceived as an additional act of trust.    This possibility was examined by Fehr and 
Rockenbach (2003).  They found one third of Actor 1 participants (15 out of 45 subjects) 





the Actor 2 participants paired with these non-punishing Actor 1 subjects provided a 
positive back transfer.  Fehr and List found the average back transfer was highest (61% of 
the tripled investment) when the punishment option was available but not used, and they 
found it was lowest (33% of the tripled investment) when the punishment option was 
available and used.   
The effects of punishment have also been examined in other ways.  Rigdon (2009) 
examined the effect of punishment on the decision of Actor 1.  Implementing the 
punishment threat increased the average transfer of Actor 1, especially when the cost of 
implementation was relatively cheap. Bohnet et al. (2001) and Charness et al. (2008) 
examined the effect of third-party punishment.  They found implementing a punishment 
threat from a third party can increase the transfer (trust) of Actor 1 and back transfer 
(trustworthiness) of Actor 2.      
 In summary, the research on punishment indicates the ability to punish may 
crowd out the positive reciprocity which trust can elicit, and the crowd out effect can be 
reduced or eliminated if the opportunity to punish is explicitly not implemented.  The 
ability to punish may increase the willingness to trust.    Third party punishment may 
increase both trust and trust worthiness. 
Research examining communication in the trust game is abundant (e.g., Charness 
& Dufwenberg, 2006; Kimbrough, et al., 2008; Schotter and Sopher, 2006; Cason, 
Sheremeta and Zhang, 2012; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2013).   However, analogous to the 
work that has been done on punishment, it appears no one has yet examined whether 





Research in business and management can be used to form a hypothesis.  Communication 
fosters trust and trustworthiness which allows the gains from cooperative behavior to be 
captured (e.g., Allert and Chatterjee, 1997; Massey and Kyriazis, 2007; Kottila and 
Ronni, 2008, Webster and Wong, 2008).   Thus, we might expect not communicating 
when the opportunity is available to discourage trustworthiness, even when trust is 
demonstrated. 
The effect of communication in the form of written message by Actor 1 has also 
not been fully examined.  Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) did consider written 
messages, and they considered three conditions:  no message, message from Actor 1 to 
Actor 2, and message from Actor 2 to Actor 1. 2    The message transmitted from Actor 2 
to Actor 1 was the most effective in terms of promoting cooperative behavior (trust 
combined with trustworthiness), and the message that particularly contained a statement 
of “promise” was most effective in this regard.     
In contrast to our one way communication experiment, or that of Charness 
Dufwenberg, most studies examine two-way communication.  For instance, Ben-Ner et 
al. (2011) reported, when subjects had an opportunity to dialogue and exchange their 
proposals prior to making decisions, the average transfer substantially increased (from 
50% to 92% of the endowment), and the back transfer significantly increased (from 42% 
                                                          
2 Unlike the standard trust game, subjects in the role of Actor 1 were allowed to choose either “In” or “Out”, and 
once Actor 1 chose “In”, Actor 2 would have an opportunity to choose either “Roll” or “Don’t Roll” a six-sided 
die. Therefore, the ultimate payoffs of both players were dependent upon a chance of success or failure when the 
responder rolled the six-sided die. When the communication goes from Actor 1to Actor 2, Actor 1 participants 
chose “In” 67% and Actor 2 subjects chose “Roll” 34% of the time, whereas Actor 1 participants chose “In” 56% 
and Actor 2 participants chose “Roll” 44% of the time when the communication is not available. There is no 
statistically significant difference between the two treatments. In the treatment where the communication goes 
from Actor 2 to Actor 1, Actor 2 participants significantly increased choosing “In” to 74% and Actor 2 





to 59% of the tripled investment).3 Alternatively, Bracht and Feltovich (2009) allowed a 
cheap talk treatment, where Actor 2 had an opportunity to send a message to Actor 1, and 
observed that cheap talk has little positive impact on the frequency of Actor 1’s 
investment (40 – 58% of the time) and Actor 2’s back transfer (40 – 48% of the time).4  
Why is communication not just cheap talk as predicted by the theory of pure self-
interest?   Bichierri el al. (2010) proposes communication is an effective mechanism to 
enhance trust and trustworthiness when it is perceived as a promise with some binding 
force. Cohen et al. (2010) proposes that effective communication expresses a strong 
concern for social and interpersonal norms related to fairness. Issac and Walker (1998) 
and Duffy and Feltovich (2002) propose and provide experimental evidence that 
communication is more effective when subjects can communicate freely face to face, as 
compared to the communication that takes place in form of numerical or written message. 
In summary, communication in the form of a one-way written message may 
impact behavior, but it is a relatively weak form of communication.   Even when there is 
no enforcement mechanism, social norms and past experiences imbedded in the psyche of 
the receiver may give the communication some force. Communication can provide a 
connection, and merely connecting may influence behavior.  Moreover, different words 
                                                          
3 Ben-Ner et al. conducted an experiment that involved four different conditions of communication: 1) no 
communication; 2) a one-stage computerized negotiation between Actor 1 and Actor 2; 3) a three stage 
computerized negotiation; and 4) a computerized pre-play chat. 
4 Bracht and Feltovich also reported that the frequency of Actor 1’s investment and Actor 2’s back transfer 
increased substantially to 71.2% and 87.7% of the time respectively in the interaction treatment, where 





provide the opportunity to connect in different ways, and some ways may elicit more 
trustworthiness than others.      
In our treatments, most Actor 1 subjects used punishment when it was available 
(62% in WPNC and 77% in WPWC), and most Actor 1 subjects use communication 
when it was available (70% in NPWC and 85% in WPWC).    Notice that adding the 
opportunity to communicate with a written message (moving from WPNC to WPWC) 
increased the willingness to use punishment.  Also, notice that adding the opportunity to 
punish (moving from NPWC to WPWC) increased the use of written communication.  
That is, punishment and communication opportunities complemented each other in terms 
of the prevalence of their use.  Yet, examining the average back transfers, we find that the 
increased use of punishment and communication in the move to the WPWC treatment 
was not particularly fruitful.  Trustworthiness was most effectively elicited when neither 
punishment nor the ability to communicate through written message was available.     
The next section examines the experimental results of the four treatments in more 
detail, seeking to extract understanding of how punishment and communication, in the 
specific forms presented here, impact trust and trustworthiness.    
4. Analysis of Experimental Results  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In order to shed the light on the issue of how the use of punishment and 
communication impacts trust and trustworthiness, we begin our analysis by separating the 
data of each experimental treatment according to whether Actor 1 adopts the ability to 





comparison of subjects’ behavior according to the following three main variables: i) the 
transfer sent by Actor 1; ii) the back transfer chosen by Actor 2; and iii) the return to 
trust, or the ratio of the back transfer to the transfer. 
Table 4 indicates the presence of trust and trustworthiness in every experimental 
setting. The average transfer of Actor 1 ranges between 50 and 70 percent of the 10 shank 
endowment, and the average back transfer chosen by Actor 2 ranges between 7 and 13 
shanks. The average return to trust ranges from 80 to 200 percent of the transfer. 
However, the back transfer tends to exhibit higher volatility than other variables 
according to the estimated coefficient of variation. The high volatility of the back transfer 
is likely if the Actor 1 subject does not communicate when communication is possible 
(1.7 in NPWC and 1.3 in WPWC).  
Irrespective of whether the ability to punish or the ability to communicate is used, 
the average transfer of Actor 1 is not significantly different from the baseline NPNC 
treatment at any conventional level according to the one-tailed t-test. Thus, we conclude 
Actor 1 subjects who adopt either the ability to punish or the ability to communicate do 
not behave differently from the condition, where neither of the two mechanisms is 
available.   
Looking at the transfer variable we also learn that the degree of trust is positively 
related to the use of the communication option but inversely related to the use of the 
punishment option.  As shown in Table 4, the average transfer is significantly lower (6.8 
to 5.8 shanks, p < 0.01) in the WPNC treatment if the ability to punish is used. 
Conversely, the average transfer is significantly higher (5.6 to 7.3 shanks p < 0.05) in the 





Table 4: Splitting Out Communication and Punishment 
    




Interestingly, this observed behavior arises in the WPWC treatment. Actor 1 
subjects who communicate but refrain from using the punishment transfer the high 
average of 8.6 shanks, while Actor 1 subjects that do not communicate but adopt the 
punishment transfer the low average of 5.0 shanks. This difference in the transfer is 
statistically significant (p < 0.01) according to the one-tailed t-test.  
Consider the back transfer chosen by Actor 2. The average back transfer is highest 
when the ability to punish and the ability to communicate are not available, or available 
but not used (12.0 in NPNC and 12.5 in WPWC). Correspondingly, the average return to 
trust is also highest when these two mechanisms are not available, or available but not 
used (1.7 in NPWC and 2.0 in WPWC). This result provides an indication that the 
presence of both punishment and communication options may place a pressure on Actor 
2 to exhibit less trustworthiness.    
Knowing the availability of punishment or communication negatively impact 
trustworthy behavior on average, it is of interest to further explore whether the degree of 
trustworthiness depends upon whether the available option is adopted by Actor 1. In 
particular, our results suggest the use of the communication option is an effective 
mechanism in eliciting Actor 2’s trustworthiness while the use of the punishment option 
is not.  
In the NPWC treatment, the average back transfer of Actor 2 is 11.0 shanks if 
Actor 2 receives a message from Actor 1, while it is only 4.8 shanks if Actor 1 stays 
silent. This difference is statistically significant at p < 0.01 according the one-tailed t-test. 
When facing punishment in the NPWC treatment, Actor 2 subjects transfer back an 





chooses not to apply the punishment. This difference is, however, not statistically 
significant according to the one-tailed t-test. Similarly, in the WPWC treatment, the 
average back transfer is 11.4 shanks if Actor 2 receives a message but does not face the 
punishment, while it is only 7.0 shanks if Actor 1 does not send the message but impose 
the punishment threat. This difference is statistically significant at p < 0.10 according to 
the one-tailed t-test. 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
In this section, we report the results of several ordinary least-squares regressions 
using the entire dataset from the four experimental treatments. This gives us the 
opportunity not only to increase the statistical power of hypothesis tests, but also to 
separately examine the availability and usage effects of punishment and communication 
on the relationship between trust and trustworthiness.  
Our regression model specifications (A) and (B) examine the treatment effects on 
Actor 2’s trustworthiness, or the effects of being in the treatments where the punishment 
and communication options are available. The dependent variable is the back transfer of 
Actor 2 𝑦𝑖, which is regressed on a set of dummy variables 𝑇𝑘,𝑖 indicating the treatment 
status, so 
(1)   𝑦𝑖 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑇𝑘,𝑖
4
𝑘=1 +  𝑖.  
This model specification, however, does not allows for the possibility that there may be 
an interaction that occurs between the availability of the option and the degree of trust 





specifications (C), (D) and (E) include another set of interaction terms between the 
treatment dummy 𝑇𝑘,𝑖 and the transfer 𝑥𝑖 sent by Actor 1. 
(2)   𝑦𝑖 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑇𝑘,𝑖
4
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑇𝑘,𝑖
4
𝑘=1 𝑥𝑖 +  𝑖.  
Note that the coefficient 𝛾𝑘 on the interaction term measures the marginal effect of trust 
on trustworthiness in each treatment (i.e., the change in the back transfer y with respect to 
a one unit change in the transfer x), or the degree of positive reciprocity exhibited by 
Actor 2. 
Finally, our regression model specifications (F), (G), and (H) examine the usage 
effect of each mechanism on Actor 2’s trustworthiness by introducing three additional 
interaction variables that indicate whether the ability to punish, the ability to 
communicate, or the combined capability is implemented. 
(3) 𝑦𝑖 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑇𝑘,𝑖
4
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑇𝑘,𝑖
4
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑖 +  𝜃1 [𝑊𝑃𝑁𝐶 ∗ 𝑌𝑝 ∗ 𝑥] + 𝜃2 [𝑁𝑃𝑊𝐶 ∗ 𝑌𝑐 ∗ 𝑥] +
𝜃3[𝑊𝑃𝑊𝐶 ∗ 𝑌𝑝 ∗ 𝑌𝑐 ∗ 𝑥]  +  𝑖.  
The usage dummy variable 𝑌𝑝 takes on the value of 1 if Actor 1 implements the 
punishment threat when the option is possible (i.e. WPNC and NPWC), 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, the usage dummy variable 𝑌𝑐 takes on the value of 1 if Actor 1 communicates 
when the option is possible (i.e., NPWC and WPWC), 0 otherwise. Thus, the coefficient 
𝜃1(𝜃2) measures the marginal effect of trust on trustworthiness when the punishment 
(communication) option is used separately in the WPNC (NPWC) treatment. Likewise, 
the coefficient 𝜃3 is a measure of the marginal of trust on trustworthiness when the two 





The results of these regressions are summarized in Table 5. Each column 
summarizes a separate regression, where the back transfer of Actor 2 is served as the 
dependent variable. The entries in each row are the estimated coefficients, with their 
standard errors below them in parentheses. The asterisks indicate whether the t-statistics, 
testing against the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is zero, is significant at the 
10% level (one asterisk), 5% level (two asterisks), or 1% level (three asterisks).    
In Model (A), each regression coefficient represents the average back transfer of 
Actor 2 in each treatment (11.96 in NPNC, 7.11 in WPNC, 9.08 in NPWC, and 7.90 in 
WPWC). Consistent with the results of our descriptive statistics, the positive and 
significant coefficients indicate the presence of trustworthiness exhibited by Actor 2 in all 
four treatments. By dropping the NPNC treatment and re-estimating the regression with a 
constant term in Model (B), we also learn that the coefficient on the NPNC treatment 
(11.96) is significantly greater than the coefficients on the WPNC and NPWC treatments 
(7.11 and 7.90) at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 respectively. Following the same approach, the 
coefficient on the NPNC treatment (9.08) is not significantly different from the 
coefficient on the NPWC treatment at any conventional level. 
This result suggests Actor 2 subjects exhibit more trustworthiness when they are 
in the condition where Actor 1 has neither the ability to punish nor the ability to 
communicate, but they exhibit less trustworthiness when the punishment option is 
available. Our result is also consistent with the findings of previous studies (e.g., Fehr 






Table 5: Regression Estimates for Actor 2’s Back Transfer 
Dependent variable: Actor 2’s actual back transfer (in shanks)         
  (A) (B)  (C) (D) (E)  (F) (G) (H) 
Treatment effects        
NPNC  11.96***  0.48      
 (1.40)  (2.57)      
WPNC 7.11*** -4.85*** 3.09      
 (1.12) (1.79) (1.96)      
NPWC 9.08*** -2.88 -1.13      
 (1.34) (1.94) (2.31)      
WPWC 7.90*** -4.06*** 0.06      
 (1.10) (1.78) (2.17)      
Treatment interaction effects           
x     1.70***    
     (0.14)    
NPNC*x   1.64*** 1.70***  1.70*** 1.70*** 1.70*** 
   (0.33) (0.14)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
WPNC*x   0.65** 1.05*** -0.65*** 1.05*** 1.05*** 1.05*** 
   (0.28) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13) 
NPWC*x   1.51*** 1.38*** -0.32* 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 
   (0.30) (0.14) (0.18) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) 
WPWC*x  1.17** 1.18*** -0.52*** 1.41*** 1.18*** 1.41*** 
   (0.30) (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) (0.12) (0.19) 
Usage effects         
WPNC *Yp*x     -0.01   
      (0.26)   
NPWC*Yc*x     0.69** 0.69** 0.69** 
      (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
WPWC*Yp*Yc*x     -0.38  -0.38 
      (0.24)  (0.24) 
Constant   11.96***             
  (1.40)       
R2 0.63 0.06 0.77 0.77 0.40 0.79 0.77 0.78 
F-Statistic 52.73 2.70 49.64 99.60 20.39 60.01 83.17 70.60 
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Notes: Absolute values of standard errors are in parentheses.  
            ***Significant at 0.01 level 
              **Significant at 0.05 level 





Model (C) includes the interaction terms between the treatment dummy variables 
and the transfers of Actor 1 (i.e., NPNC*x, WPNC*x, NPWC*x, and WPWC*x).  The 
estimated coefficients on the treatment dummy variables all become indistinguishable 
from zero when the interaction terms are incorporated in the regression. This implies the 
availability of punishment and communication does not directly impact Actor 2’s 
trustworthiness in an absolute sense, but rather it tends to affect the marginal effect of 
trust on trustworthiness.  
We suspect that the treatment dummy might be an irrelevant variable in the 
model, which can potentially cause an increase in the variance of the estimator. To test 
this hypothesis and to avoid the problem of adding irrelevant variable, we then estimate 
Model (D) by excluding the treatment dummy variables that are not significantly 
different from zero in Model (C).  As shown in Table 5, the coefficients on the interaction 
terms in Model (D) are still statistically significant different from zero, and the R-squared 
value (0.77) is not sensitive to the exclusion of the treatment dummy variables. 
Therefore, we confirm that the treatment dummy is irrelevant and can be removed from 
the model.  
Model (D) also suggests Actor 2 in the baseline NPNC treatment reciprocates the 
trusting behavior of Actor 1 by returning 1.70 shanks for each shank received. This 
marginal effect of trust on trustworthiness tends to decline significantly when adding the 
ability to punish or the ability communicate (1.05 in WPNC, 1.38 in WPNC, and 1.18 in 
WPWC). To determine the level of statistical difference, we re-estimate the regression by 





suggest the coefficient on the NPNC*x variable is significantly greater than the 
coefficients of other interaction terms.  
Model (F) is similar to Model (E) but allows for the interaction variables (i.e., 
WPNC*Yp*x, NPWC*Yc*x, and WPWC*Yp*Yc*x) to capture the usage effects of 
punishment, communication, and both mechanisms on trustworthiness. The model 
indicates only the coefficient on the NPWC*Yc*x variable (0.69) is positive and 
significant (p < 0.05), while the coefficients on other usage interaction variables are 
negative and not significant at any conventional level (-0.01 for WPNC*Yp*x and -0.38 
for WPWC*Yp*Yc*x).  
This result provides evidence that a written message from Actor 1 to Actor 2 is 
not a cheap talk as predicted by the self-interest hypothesis, but it is an effective 
mechanism to reinforce the ability of trust to elicit trustworthiness. Implementing the 
punishment threat does not substantially crowds out the ability of trust to elicit 
trustworthiness. The coefficient on the WPNC*Yp*x variable is negative but it is not 
significant. Thus, we are unable to replicate the findings of Fehr and List (2004) that not 
using a punishment threat elicits trustworthiness. 
We estimate models (G) and (H) by excluding the usage interaction variables that 
are not statistically significant in Model (F). As shown in Table 5, the coefficient on the 
NPWC*Yc*x variable (0.69) is insensitive to the exclusion and remains statistically 
significant at p < 0.05 in both regression models. This confirms the effectiveness of using 





Model (G) indicates the marginal effect of trust on trustworthiness is highest 
when neither the ability to punish nor the ability to communicate is available (𝛽1 = 1.70 
for NPNC). Or, conversely, the availability of punishment and communication options 
reduces the marginal effects of trust on trustworthiness (𝛽2 = 1.05 for WPNC; 𝛽3 =
0.88 for NPWC; and 𝛽4 = 1.18). Model (G) indicates communication should be used 
when it is available. When Actor 1 in the NPWC treatment sends a message to Actor 2, 
the marginal effect of trust on trustworthiness increase from 0.88 to 1.57 (0.88 + 0.69 = 
1.57). 
In summary, our regression results from models (A) – (H) indicates the presence 
of both the ability to punish and the ability to communicate can reduce the marginal 
effect of trust on trustworthiness. However, this marginal loss can be mitigate if Actor 1 
uses the communication option. Figure 1 presents the predicted back transfer 𝑦, or the 
predicted level of trustworthiness. The positive impact of trust on trustworthiness is 
shown. A larger transfer 𝑥 yields a larger back transfer  𝑦 in each case. Trust is most 
productive in the standard NPNC trust game where no punishment and no 
communication can occur. The larger marginal effect of using communication when it is 
available is also evident.5 
 
                                                          
5 Also note that subjects in the experiment are allowed to play the trust game twice. That is, after the first 
game, Actor 1 and Actor 2 are then randomly paired and reassigned to play the second game in one the four 
experimental treatments that they never experience before.  Thus, a great deal of care has been taken to ensure 
that there is no significant learning effect between the first and the second games. The results obtained from 
a variety of econometric tests strongly suggest the absent of learning effect and the consistency of behavior 






Figure 1: Relationship between Transfer and Actual Back Transfer 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In this study, we conducted a trust game experiment with four treatments to obtain 
improved understanding about how individuals respond to the availability of punishment 
and communication. The NPNC treatment is the standard trust game, providing a baseline 
measure of trust and trustworthiness. The WPNC treatment allows Actor 1 to penalize 
trustee for not providing the desired back transfer, whereas the NPWC treatment allows 
Actor 1 to communicate with trustee in the form of a written message. The WPWC 
treatment combines the WPNC treatment with the NPWC treatment, providing Actor 1 
with both the ability to punish and the ability communicate.  
Consistent with previous studies, we find the presence of trust and trustworthiness 
in all four treatments. Subjects are not motivated purely by self-interest motive. We also 































cheap talk, rather it has a significant positive effect on eliciting Actor 2’s trustworthiness. 
However, we did not find a significant positive effect of refraining from implementing 
the punishment, as suggested by previous studies. 
A central findings from the treatments is the availability of punishment and 
communication significantly lessens marginal effect of trust on trustworthiness. Actor 1 
can mitigate this loss associated with communication by choosing to use the option to 
communicate. Our results also indicate that, if both options are used, the choice to punish 
tends to cancel out the positive effect which communication tends to have when it is used 
separately. The vast majority of subjects in the WPWC experiment tend to apply both of 
mechanisms, not anticipating the reduction in fruitfulness of their trust. Future research 
could seek to understand this phenomenon.  
There are a number of possible extensions to our study. First, we find one-way 
communication from the trustor is not a cheap talk, but rather it can promote trsuworthy 
behavior. However, not all forms of communication are effective. Future work could 
provide insight about what types of messages help translate trust into trustworthiness and 
why. 
 Second, a large literature argues generous intention is a determinant of positive 
reciprocity (e.g., Falk et al., 2008; McCabe et al., 2003; Xiao and Bicchieri, 2010). This 
approach suggests people are kind to the other if they feel that the other intends to be 
kind.  In our experimental setting, Actor 1 can express his intention through the desired 
back transfer. Of particular interest is the possibility that Actor 2 appreciates Actor 1 who 
intends to split earnings equally, so this intention is rewarded with positive reciprocity. 





 Finally, given the body of experimental evidence which systematically refutes the 
self-interest hypothesis, future research is needed to advance theoretical alternatives to 
self-interest. The multiplicity of alternative (i.e., altruism, fairness, inequality aversion, 
positive reciprocity, and intention appreciation) suggest the need for a meta theory.    
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Appendix A: Instructions for the experiment. 
You are actor 1 
Description of Your Decision Problem 
You are a participant in the following decision-making problem.  You have been randomly matched 
with another participant in this problem who is in another room.  You will never be informed of 
the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant 
will never be informed about your identity.  You are in the role of actor 1 and the matched 
participant is in the role of actor 2.  You as well as actor 2 participate only once in this decision 
problem.  You make your decisions with the help of the decision sheet that has been handed out 
together with this description.  Here are the rules that you and actor 2 have to obey when you make 
your decisions: 
Endowment 
At the beginning both actors receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks (experimental currency 
units) 
Your decision 
You have to make a decision that consists of two components: 
1)  A transfer between 0 and 10 shanks to actor 2. 
You can transfer any amount between 0 and 10 shanks to actor 2.  You make this decision 
by indicating a number between 0 and 10 in the appropriate box on your decision sheet.  
We will then triple this transferred amount, i.e., actor 2 receives three times the amount of 
shanks you transferred. 
2)  A desired back-transfer from actor 2. 
After you have made your transfer to actor 2 you indicate a desired back-transfer on your 
decision sheet.  The desired back-transfer is the amount you would like to receive back 
from actor 2.  The desired back-transfer can be any number between 0 and three times the 
amount you have transferred. 
The decision of actor 2 
Once you have fixed both components of your decision sheet, we collect your decision sheet and 
give it to actor 2.  In this way we inform actor 2 about your decisions.  The actor 2 can transfer any 
amount of the total number of shanks he received back to you. 
Payoffs 
You as actor 1 received: 10 shanks – transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from actor 2. 
Actor 2 receives: 10 shanks + 3*transfer from actor 1 – back-transfer to actor 1. 





You are actor 1 
Description of a New Decision Problem 
You now participate in a new decision-making problem.  As before, you have been randomly 
matched with another participant in another room.  You are again in the role of actor 1.  The other 
participant is in the role of actor 2.  Notice that in this new decision problem you are matched with 
a new person, i.e., actor 2 is now a different person compared too the previous problem.  Once 
again, you will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the 
experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. 
The new decision problem is—with one exception—identical to the previous problem.  The 
exception concerns the conditional payoff cut.  In the new problem you can impose a condition 
payoff cut of 4 shanks on actor 2.  In every other respect the problem is the same.  Thus both actors 
again receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks. 
Your decision 
Again you have to indicate on your decision sheet what amount you want to transfer to actor 2 and 
what your desired back-transfer is.  Actor 2 receives three times the amount of shanks you 
transferred. 
In addition to the transfer and desired back-transfer you also have to indicate on your decision sheet 
if you want to impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks on actor 2. 
 A conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks for actor 2 has the following consequences: The payoff 
of actor 2 will be reduced by 4 shanks if his actual back-transfer is less than your desired 
back-transfer.  The conditional payoff cut is not due, i.e., it does not reduce the income of 
actor 2, if actor 2 transfers exactly your desired amount or more to you 
 If you do not impose a conditional payoff cut—the income of actor 2 will not be reduced, 
irrespective of how large the back-transfer of actor 2 is. 
 
The decision of actor 2 
Once you have fixed all three components of your decision sheet, we collect your decision sheet 
and give it to actor 2.  In this way we inform actor 2 about your decisions.  The actor 2 can transfer 
any amount of the total number of shanks he received back to you.  In case that you have chose a 
conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks, and if actor 2 transfers back less than what you desired, the 
conditional payoff cut is due. 
Payoffs 
You as actor 1 received: 10 shanks – transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from actor 2. 
Actor 2 receives: 10 shanks + 3*transfer from actor 1 – back-transfer to actor 1 - 4 
shanks (in case that a conditional payoff cut has been imposed and is due). 






You are actor 2 
Description of Your Decision Problem 
You are a participant in the following decision-making problem.  You have been randomly matched 
with another participant in this problem who is in another room.  You will never be informed of 
the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant 
will never be informed about your identity.  You are in the role of actor 2 and the matched 
participant is in the role of actor 2.  You as well as actor 1 participate only once in this decision 
problem.  You make your decisions with the help of the decisions sheet that has been handed out 
together with this description.  Here are the rules that you and actor 1 have to obey when you make 
your decisions: 
Endowment 
At the beginning both actors receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks (experimental currency 
units). 
The decision of actor 1 
First actor 1 has to make a decision that consists of the following two components: 
1)  A transfer between 0 and 10 shanks to actor 2. 
Actor 1 can transfer any amount between 0 and 10 shanks to you.  Actor 1 makes this 
decision by indicating a number between 0 and 10 in the appropriate box on the decision 
sheet.  We will then triple this transferred amount, i.e., you will receive three times the 
amount of shanks you transferred. 
2)  A desired back-transfer from actor 2. 
After actor 1 has made a transfer to you he indicated a desired back-transfer on your 
decision sheet.  The desired back-transfer is the amount he would like to receive back from 
you.  The desired back-transfer can be any number between 0 and three times the amount 
that actor 1 has transferred to you. 
Your decision 
Once actor 1 has fixed both components of the decision, we collect the decision sheet and give it 
to you.  In this way we inform you about actor 1’s decisions.  Then you can transfer any amount of 
the total number of shanks you received back to actor 1.   
Payoffs 
Actor 1 receives: 10 shanks – transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from actor 2. 
You as actor 2 receive: 10 shanks + 3*transfer from actor 1 – back-transfer to actor 1. 





You are actor 2 
Description of a New Decision Problem 
You will now participate in a new decision-making problem.  As before, you have been randomly 
matched with another participant in another room.  You are again in the role of actor 2.  The other 
participant is in the role of actor 1.  Notice that in this new decision problem you are matched with 
a new person, i.e., actor 1 is now a different person compared to the previous problem.  Once 
again, you will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the 
experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. 
The new decision problem is—with one exception—identical to the previous problem.  The 
exception concerns the conditional payoff cut.  In the new problem actor 1 can impose a condition 
payoff cut of 4 shanks on you.  In every other respect the problem is the same.  Thus both actors 
again receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks. 
The decision of actor 1 
Again actor 1 has to indicate on the decision sheet what amount he wants to transfer to you and 
what his desired back-transfer is.  You receive three times the amount of shanks actor 1 transferred 
to you. 
In addition to the transfer and desired back-transfer actor 1 also has to indicate on the decision sheet 
if you want to impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks on you. 
 A conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks has the following consequences for you: Your payoff 
will be reduced by 4 shanks if your actual back-transfer is less than the desired back-
transfer of actor 1.  The conditional payoff cut is not due, i.e., it does not reduce your 
income, if you transfer exactly the desired amount or more to actor 1. 
 If actor 1 does not impose a conditional payoff cut—your income will not be reduced, 
irrespective of how large your back-transfer to actor 1 is. 
 
Your decision 
Once actor 1 has fixed all three components of the decision, we collect the decision sheet and give 
it to you.  In this way we inform you about actor 1’s decisions.  Then you can transfer any amount 
of the total number of shanks received back to actor 1.  In case that actor 1 imposed a conditional 
payoff cut of 4 shanks, and if you transfer back less than actor 1’s desired amount, the conditional 
payoff cut is due. 
Payoffs 
Actor 1 receives: 10 shanks – transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from actor 2. 
You as actor 2 receive: 10 shanks + 3*transfer from actor 1 – back-transfer to actor 1 - 4 
shanks (in case that a conditional payoff cut has been imposed and is due). 





Appendix B: Demographic questions 
 
Individual demographic questions 
Race         White, Non-White 
Sex         Male, Female 
Did your father obtain a college degree?                  Yes, No 
Did your mother obtain a college degree?                  Yes, No 
Do you have a college degree?                   Yes, No 
Did you complete high school?                   Yes, No 
Did your parents remain married while you grew up?                Yes, No 
Were you a victim of some significant kind of abuse as a child?               Yes, No 
Are you married?       Yes, No 
Are you an only child?                    Yes, No 
Size of your income relative to others at the university                Average, Below average, 
Above average 
Size of city where you grew (best representation)                 Small town/rural, Small 
City, Big City 
Nationality        
 ______________________ 
Religion       
 ______________________ 
Your age        _____ 
Number of close friends                    _____ 
Number of hours worked per week for pay                 _____ 
Number of volunteer organizations you belong to                   _____ 
Number of hours spent volunteering per week                 _____ 
 
“Attitude” Questions (or opinions that might have a bearing upon trust or trustworthiness) 
 
Questions from the General Social Survey 
 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?   
 Most people can be trusted  Can’t be too careful 
 
Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would 
they try to be fair? 
 Would take advantage of you  Would try to be fair 
 
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves? 




To what extent do you agree with the following statements:   
 
“Personal income should not be determined by work.” 
 
Strongly agree      Somewhat agree Undecided Somewhat disagree Strongly 






“You cannot count on strangers anymore.” 
 
Strongly agree      Somewhat agree Undecided Somewhat disagree Strongly 
disagree   
“I trust others.” 
 
Strongly agree      Somewhat agree Undecided Somewhat disagree Strongly 
disagree   
 
“You cannot trust strangers anymore” 
 
Strongly agree      Somewhat agree Undecided Somewhat disagree Strongly 
disagree   
 
“I am trustworthy.” 
 
Strongly agree      Somewhat agree Undecided Somewhat disagree Strongly 
disagree   
 
“When dealing with strangers, one is better off using caution before trusting them”  
 
Strongly agree      Somewhat agree Undecided Somewhat disagree Strongly 
disagree   
 
 
“Behavior” questions (or questions about past actions involving trust) 
 
How often do you leave a door of yours unlocked? 
  
 Very Often Often  Sometimes  Rarely  Never 
 
How often do you lend money to others? 
 
 Very Often Often  Sometimes  Rarely  Never 
 
How often do you lend personal possessions other than money to others? 
 
 Very Often Often  Sometimes  Rarely  Never 
 
How often have you benefited from the generosity of a person you did not know? 
 
 Very Often Often  Sometimes  Rarely  Never 
 
Honesty Index Questions 
 
How much have you lied to your parents? 
  
Very Often Often  Sometimes  Rarely  Never 
 
How much have you lied to your close friends? 
  





How much have you lied to acquaintances? 
  
Very Often Often  Sometimes  Rarely  Never 
 
How much have you lied to strangers? 
  







































Appendix C: Testing for learning effects 
To examine the presence of learning effect during the experiment, we follow two 
different approaches including a Wald chi-square test of equality and game-specific dummy 
variable.  
A Wald Chi-Square Test of Equality 
First, we estimate a separate regression for Game 1 and Game 2 using Model (G), which is the 
best fit regression model:   
𝑦 =  ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑇𝑘𝑥
4
𝑘=1
+ 𝜃2𝑇3𝑌𝑐𝑥 + =  𝛾1𝑇1𝑥 + 𝛾2𝑇2𝑥 + 𝛾3𝑇3𝑥 + 𝛾4𝑇4𝑥 + 𝜃2𝑇3𝑌𝑐𝑥 +   
Then, we examine whether the estimated coefficients differ across the two games using the Wald 
chi-square test. 
Dependent variable: Actor 2’s actual back transfer (in shanks) 
 Game 1 Game 2 Chi-Square 
2  Probability 
NPNC *  x 2.01*** 1.50*** 6.21 0.23 
 (0.24) (0.21)   
WPNC * x 1.05*** 1.55***   
 (0.16) (0.26)   
NPWC * x 0.50 0.94***   
 (0.71) (0.34)   
WPWC *x 1.36*** 1.06***   
 (0.20) (0.18)   
NPWC*Yc*x 1.24* 0.19   
 (0.74) (0.49)   
R2 0.82 0.75   
Observations 63 63   
Notes: Null hypothesis: No behavioral difference between Game 1 and Game 2; 𝛾𝑘
𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒1 =  𝛾𝑘
𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒1, and 𝜃𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒1 = 
𝜃𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒2. Absolute values of standard errors are in parentheses.  
            ***Significant at 0.01 level 
              **Significant at 0.05 level 
                *Significant at 0.10 level 
 
The result from the Wald test chi-square test ( 2 = 6.21) indicates that there is no significant 





null hypothesis, and conclude that allowing subjects to play the game twice does not create any 
learning effect in the experiment. 
Game-Specific Dummy Variable 
This approach allows a dummy variable to capture behavioral difference between Game 1 and 
Game 2. We create the dummy variable G2 to categorize the second game: G2 = 1 if subject plays 
the game second time, 0 otherwise. Thus, we specify the following regression model.  
𝑦 =  𝛽𝐺2 + 𝛾1𝑇1𝑥 + 𝜇1𝑇1𝑥 𝐺2 + 𝛾2𝑇2𝑥 + 𝜇2𝑇2𝑥𝐺2 + 𝛾3𝑇3𝑥 + 𝛾3𝑇3𝑥𝐺2 + 𝛾4𝑇4𝑥 + 𝛾4𝑇4𝑥𝐺2  
+  𝜃𝑇3𝑌𝑐𝑥 + 𝜑𝑇3𝑌𝑐𝑥𝐺2 +  
The coefficient 𝛽 indicates the different level of Actor 2’s back transfer between Game 1 and 
Game 2. The coefficient 𝜇𝑖  indicates the difference in the marginal effect of trust in each 
treatment between the two games, and the coefficient 𝜑 indicates how the use of communication 
in Game 1 differs from Game 2. 
Dependent variable: Actor 2’s actual back transfer (in shanks) 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
NPNC *  x 2.01*** 0.23 
NPNC *  x * G2 -0.53 0.33 
WPNC * x 1.04*** 0.15 
WPNC * x * G2 -0.02 0.36 
NPWC * x 0.50 0.67 
NPWC * x * G2 0.42 0.74 
WPWC * x  1.35*** 0.18 
WPWC * x * G2 -0.31 0.30 
NPWC* Yc * x  1.24** 0.69 
NPWC* Yc * x * G2 -1.05 0.81 
G2 0.21 1.45 
R2 0.78  
Observations 126  
                                   Notes: Absolute values of standard errors are in parentheses.  
                                             ***Significant at 0.01 level 
                                               **Significant at 0.05 level 






The results indicate all of the estimated coefficients on the dummy variables G2 are not 
statistically significant at any conventional level. Thus, subjects do not behave differently 


































This paper presents a theoretical model of play in the trust game that specifically 
features the potential which proposing equality has for promoting positive 
reciprocal behavior. The model proposes the utility function where the second 
mover appreciates the first mover that intends to split all earnings equally, and 
rewards this intention with positive reciprocity. The second mover optimizes given 
the preference, and the first mover optimizes while recognizing the optimizing 
behavior and preference of the second mover. The optimizing behavior is then 
tested econometrically against the trust experimental data in which the first mover 
has an opportunity to numerically indicate the desired amount that he would like to 
receive back from the second mover. The findings suggest that the second mover 
maximizes the utility when the first mover proposes equality (two thirds of the 
tripled investment) and aims to reciprocate this equality intention by sending back 
the desired amount. On the other hand, when the first mover does not propose 
equality, the second mover corrects this inequality intention by sending back less 













The self-interest hypothesis that assumes people are motivated purely by their self-
interest has long been a central assumption in simplifying the complexity of human behavior in 
most economic models. Sear and Funk (1990, p. 248) describe in some detail how the hypothesis 
is developed: 
“The self-interest hypothesis normally revolves around three basic 
psychological assumptions: the idea of materialistic hedonism, or a simple 
pleasure-pain principle of human motivation; the idea of egotism, that 
outcomes to the self are weighed more heavily than outcomes to others; 
and the idea of rationality, that decisions are made on the basis of 
reasonable calculations limited primarily by the amount of information 
available.” 
In practice, the self-interest hypothesis has been challenged systematically by the collected 
evidence from experimental studies. Many economists have proved that in many game 
experiments subjects do not behave selfishly, but rather they are concerned about morals, 
fairness, generosity, and the well-being of others (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; 
Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Fehr and List 2004; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003).  
Such observations in the game experiments have led economists to argue that the 
self-interest might be a false premise that prevents the ability of economic models to 
predict behavior. Subsequently, several studies have proposed a new class of theories, 
known as theories of social preferences, that extends individual satisfaction beyond own 
material self-interest (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 
2006; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Levine, 1998; Rabin, 1993). 
These newly developed theories indicate people also care about outcomes and actions of 





use economic reasoning but not limited to the self-interest, so the concept of utility 
maximization can still be applied to analyze the behavior and equilibrium of the game 
experiments. 
In the context of a trust game experiment, a large body of experimental evidence 
suggest subjects frequently exhibit trust and trustworthiness,  indicating strong social 
preferences in the population (e.g., Berg, 1995; Barr, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000; Cochard, 
Nguyen and Willinger, 2004; Camerer, 2003; Johnson and Mislin, 2011; Willinger, 
Keser, Lohmann and Usunier, 2003). Recently, the main focus of the research on this 
topic has been to apply the existing theories of social preferences to identify a specific 
type of preference in laboratory experiments (e.g., fairness, altruism, positive 
reciprocity). To date, however, there is no theoretical model of the trust game that allows 
for and consolidates multiple types of social preferences in subject’s decision making. 
Thus, the development of this model will provide additional insight into the motives and 
driving force behind the observed pattern of trusting and trustworthy behavior.  
Another aspect of the trust game that has been absent in the literature is the 
potential of generous intention in promoting positive reciprocity. Previous studies seek to 
understand subject’s intentions and motives using communication in the form of written 
message, exchange proposal, and face-to-face (e.g., Issac and Walker, 1998; Duffy and 
Feltovich, 2002; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). To our knowledge, no study has 
recognized the potential of the numerical message, which can be used as a means for the 
first mover to communicate with the second mover. Most importantly, this form of 
communication also helps the second mover to recognize the motives and intentions of 
the first mover in the experiment. The second mover may care about his opponent’s 





may want to reward this good intention with positive reciprocity. On the other hand, if he 
feels that the first mover intends to behave greedily, he may want to correct this bad 
intention with negative reciprocity, or hostile actions.  
This study makes three important contributions to the literature. First, the study 
introduces a new model of play in the trust game that comprehensively consolidates all types of 
social preferences in the second mover’s decision making. Second, the model specifically features 
the potential which proposing equality has for promoting positive reciprocal behavior. In 
particular, we proposes the utility function where the second mover appreciates the first mover 
that intends to split all earnings equally, and rewards this intention with positive reciprocity. 
Third, this paper illustrates cooperative equilibria in a one-shot trust game may exist if the self-
interested first mover has the ability to recognize the preferences and optimizing behavior of the 
second mover. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed 
discussion of recent social preference theories. Section 3 presents our model of social preferences 
in the trust game. Section 4 applies this model to the trust game experiment, in which the first 
mover has an opportunity to numerically indicate the desired amount that he would like to receive 
back from the second mover. Section 5 presents empirical evidence that the majority of subject 
actions in the trust game experiment considered in the previous section are consistent with the 
prediction of our model. Section 6 provides theory and empirical evidence that the ability to 
recognize the second mover’s optimizing behavior and preferences may allow the first mover to 
exhibit trust. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2. Review of Related Theoretical Studies 
During the last two decades a number of behavioral economists have attempted to 





reply on the notion of social preferences, assuming people care not only about their own payoffs 
but also the payoffs allocated to others. More specifically, the utility of person 𝑖 is sensitive to the 
variation of payoffs received by person 𝑗, 𝑥𝑗, for any given of his resource allocation, 𝑥𝑖.  
 “Inequity aversion” is a certain type of social preferences, which places an emphasis on 
the idea that people care for fairness and they are reluctant to incidental inequalities. Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) propose the model, where an individual’s utility function can either be increasing 
or decreasing function in the payoffs allocated to others. In the two-person case, the utility of 
person i is given by 
1) 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖(𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖, 0) − 𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗, 0)    
or, 
             𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) =  {
   𝑥𝑖 −  𝛼𝑖(𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖)      𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑖 <  𝑥𝑗  
𝑥𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗, 0)    𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑖 >  𝑥𝑗
 
where 𝛼𝑖 > 𝛽𝑖 > 0 and 𝛽𝑖  ≤ 1. The model indicates people make decisions so as to minimize 
inequity in outcomes (𝛼𝑖 > 𝛽𝑖 > 0), and they dislike disadvantageous inequality more than 
advantageous inequality (𝛼𝑖 ≥ 𝛽𝑖) 
Ottone and Ponzano (2005) argue that the linear utility function is a critical drawback in 
the Fehr-Schmidt model, which prevents interior solutions in some experimental games. To 
address the problem, Ottone and Ponzano proposes a further modification to the model by 
allowing the concavity in the utility function. Their model is given by 
2) 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖 (
𝑥𝑗−𝑥𝑖
𝜎𝑥𝑖+1
, 0) − 𝛽𝑖 (
𝑥𝑖−𝑥𝑗
𝛾𝑥𝑖+1
, 0)    
The model works in the exact same manner as the original Fehr-Schmidt model, except assumes 
that people are concerned about their incomes as an unequal weight difference among population. 





   The alternative model of inequity aversion is independently developed by Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000). The model has provided substantial success in rationalizing a variety of 
puzzling evidence in many experiments (i.e., generosity in dictator, trust game, and gift 
exchange). In the model, the utility function of person i is given by  
3) 𝑈𝑖 =  𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝜎𝑖) 
and 
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where 𝑥𝑖 is person i’s own payoff and 𝜎𝑖 is person i’s share of income. For any given 𝑥𝑖, the 
utility function of person i is strictly increasing and diminishing in the share of income 𝜎𝑖.  
Unlike Fehr and Schmidt, the Bolton-Ockenfels model assumes that person i is more 
concerned about the average income of all people than the relative income of the opponent. Note 
that 𝑑𝑈𝑖 𝑑⁄ 𝑥𝑗 does not depend on person j’s relative position toward person i, but on how greater 
person i does when he compares himself to the average. That is, if person i stands at the position 
where his income 𝑥𝑖 is above the average, he is willing to allocate more resources to person j 
regardless of whether person j is at a better or poorer position. On the other hand, if 𝑥𝑖 is below 
the average, person i would reduce person j’s income irrespective of whether person j has a much 
lower income.  
“Altruism” is another type of social preference, which has been used extensively to 
describe the pattern of behavior observed during experiments. Behavioral economists formally 
define altruism as an unconditional form of kindness, or the willingness to sacrifice own 
resources in order to promote the well-being of others without an expectation of receiving any 
recognition from the act (Andreoni, 1989; Cox et al., 2001; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness 





The simplest version of the altruistic model only includes a parameter to express a 
concern for the overall efficiency, so  
4) 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, … , 𝑥𝑁) = 𝑥𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑖≠𝑗    𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛾𝑖 > 0  
The model indicates, for an altruist, his or her utility function is positive and increasing in the 
well-being of others. The altruist will assign a certain weight on the well-being of all 
others (𝛾𝑖 > 0), so the partial derivatives with respect to the payoffs received by those other 
people are strictly positive and increasing 𝑑𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, … , 𝑥𝑁) 𝑑𝑥𝑗 > 0⁄ , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Equivalently, this 
condition implies person i cares about the overall efficiency in addition to his own self-interest.  
Andreoni and Miller (2002) conduct a series of dictator game experiments to test the 
validity and reliability of the simple altruistic model and find that the model is substantially 
successful at explaining such variations in the data. However, several studies at the time also 
attempt to develop alternative models of altruism, and the focus of those studies is to connect the 
Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion to the preference for altruism. (e.g., Levine 1998; Huck 
et al., 2001; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Erlei, 2004; Cox et al., 2006; Rotemberg, 2004).6 In the 
following, we describe some of these models in more detail. 
Charness and Rabin (2002) propose the model of quasi-maximin preferences, where the 
altruistic preference and the Rawlsian inequality aversion together are combined. In the model, 
the utility function of person i is a convex combination of his own payoff and the social welfare 
function:  
5)   𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , … , 𝑥𝑁) = (1 − 𝛾)𝑥𝑖 +  𝛾[𝛿 ∗ min{𝑥𝑖, … , 𝑥𝑁} + (1 − 𝛿) ∗ (𝑥𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝑥𝑁)  
In the two-person case, the model can be written as 
                                                          
6 A comprehensive review for the theoretical models that combine altruism and inequality aversion together 





       𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =  {
   𝑥𝑖 +  𝛾(1 − 𝛿)𝑥𝑗       𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑖 <  𝑥𝑗  
(1 − 𝛾𝛿)𝑥𝑖 +   𝛾𝑥𝑗  𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑖 ≥  𝑥𝑗
 
where 𝛿 parameterizes the weight assigned on the maxi-min criterion. The model indicates the 
altruist cares not only about the well-being of others but also the relative standing of the others.  
Similarly, Kohler (2011) argues the models of altruism and inequity aversion both are 
sharing a similarity in their properties. In particular, he disputes the Fehr-Schmidt model simply 
ignores the parameter of efficiency concern 𝛾 by setting it equal zero. In his work, the utility 
function is given by 
6) 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑥𝑗 − 𝛼𝑖(𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖, 0) − 𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗, 0)             
Or 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) =  {
𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑥𝑗 − 𝛼𝑖(𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖)  𝑖𝑓  𝑥𝑗 > 𝑥𝑖 
𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑥𝑗 − 𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗) 𝑖𝑓   𝑥𝑗 < 𝑥𝑖 
 
When 𝛾𝑖 ≠ 0, player i is altruistic and his optimal behavior can be determined directly by a trade-
off among the preferences for inequality aversion and altruism (𝛾, 𝛼, 𝛽). The model preserves not 
only the interpretation of the Fehr-Schmidt model but also the preference for altruism in the 
decision making.  
Engelmann (2012) criticizes the simple modification in the work of Kohler (2011) that it 
provides an implausible prediction for some experimental games. If the altruistic preference is 
added directly into the inequality aversion model, then as long as experimental games with a 
given number of players are considered, the parameters of the model cannot be uniquely 
identified. 
In the opposite of the altruistic preference, several theoretical studies seek to explain 
subjects’ behavior by recognizing the ideas of envy and jealousy (Bolton, 1991; Kirchsteiger, 





These studies establish the utility function, where person i’s utility is strictly decreasing in person 
j’s payoff 𝑑𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) 𝑑𝑥𝑗 < 0⁄ , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
“Reciprocity” is another type of social preferences that has been widely recognized by 
behavioral economists to explain the pattern of experimental data. Fehr and Gachter (2000) define 
reciprocity as “an in-kind response to beneficial or harmful acts”: people tend to produce 
rewarding action in response to another positive action and hostile action in response to another 
negative action.  
The theoretical model that incorporates reciprocity into the utility function is originally 
developed by Cox et al. (2006). The model suggests the following form of the utility function. 




𝛼 +  𝜑𝑥𝑗
𝛼)  𝑖𝑓 𝛼 ≠ 0   
(𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑗)
𝜑 𝑖𝑓 𝛼 = 0
 
where 𝛼 parameterizes the curvature of the indifference curve in the planner of person i’s income 
(𝑥𝑖) and person j’s income (𝑥𝑗) space . The marginal rate substitution between 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 is then 
given by 













The model describes the preferences for altruism and spite throughout the emotional state of 
person i, which is represented the parameter 𝜑 = 𝜑(𝑟).  This emotional state depends upon the 
reciprocity motive r which is defined as 𝑟(𝑥) =  𝑥?̅?(𝑐𝑗) − 𝑥𝑖
0, where 𝑥?̅?(𝑐𝑗) is the maximum 
payoff person i can generate  given person j’s choice 𝑐𝑗 and 𝑥𝑖
0 is an appropriate reference payoff. 
The reciprocity motive function demonstrates the idea that person i recognizes the additional 
payoff as person j’s kindness, which needs to be reciprocated positively [𝑥?̅?(𝑐𝑗) > 𝑥𝑖





shortfall from his appropriate reference 𝑥𝑖
0 as a violation that needs to be reciprocated 
negatively [𝑥?̅?(𝑐𝑗) < 𝑥𝑖
0].   
 Another approach in modeling the preference for positive reciprocity is to allow for the 
possibility that people may care about their opponent’s intention, formally known as “the theories 
of intention based reciprocity”. For example, an individual may be kind to his opponent if he 
believes that his opponent has a generous intention to him.  
Rabin (1993) originally develops the theory of the intention based reciprocity for a 
simple two-person case by proposing kindness function within the utility function 
8) 𝑈𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗, 𝑐𝑖) =  𝑥𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗) + 𝑓?̅?(𝑐𝑖, 𝑏𝑗)[1 + 𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑗)]  
where  𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) denotes the kindness function measuring how kind person i is to person j , and 
𝑓?̅?(𝑐𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) denotes how person i perceives person j’s kindness.
7 The first term in the utility function 
is simply the standard utility function. In the second term, if person i perceives person j’s 
kindness [𝑓?̅?(𝑐𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) > 0], person i receives some additional utility from being kind to person j. On 
the other hand, if person j is perceived to be unkind [𝑓?̅?(𝑐𝑖, 𝑏𝑗) < 0], person i experiences the loss 
in his utility and will compensate this loss by being unkind to person j.  
The next section provides a theoretical model of play in the trust game, seeking to extract 
understanding of how proposing equality has a potential for promoting positive reciprocal 
behavior, and how social preferences can influence subject’s beliefs and actions.   
                                                          






 where 𝑎𝑖 denotes strategy 
chosen by player i and 𝑏𝑗 denote player i’s belief about what player j is going to do. The variable 𝑥𝑗
𝑒(𝑏𝑗) is an 








the highest and the lowest payoffs of player j, respectively. Then, the model captures how player I perceive 






  where 𝑐𝑖  denotes player i’s belief about what 





3. The Model 
In Berg et al.’s (1995) study of trust and reciprocity, the standard trust game is played as 
follows.  Two subjects are randomly assigned in the role of Actor 1 and Actor 2, and both are 
paired anonymously without knowing any identity of their matched counterparts. Subjects receive 
an endowment of 10 shanks (experimental units). Actor 1 chooses a transfer amount of  𝑥 ∈
 {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10} and indicates a desired back transfer ?̂?  ∈  {0, 1, 2, . . . , 3𝑥}.  Each shanks 
transferred by Actor 1 will triple by the time Actor 2 receive it, and Actor 2 then chooses the 
actual back transfer 𝑦 ∈  {0, 1, 2, . . . , 3𝑥}.  
The payoff received by Actor 1 is given by 𝜋1 = 10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦, and the payoff received 
Actor 2 is given by 𝜋2 = 10 + 3𝑥 − 𝑦.  The degree of trust in the experiment is captured by the 
willingness of Actor 1 to transfer a positive amount of initial endowment (0 < 𝑥 ≤ 10)  to Actor 
2 in the first stage. Likewise, the degree of trustworthiness is the willingness of Actor 2 to send 
back some amount of tripled transfer (0 < 𝑦 ≤ 3𝑥) in the second stage.    
Knowing each shank transferred generates the surplus of three shanks 3𝑥, Actor 1 who 
cares for equality will allocate one-third of the total surplus to Actor 2, so that each player can 
receive the earning of 10 + 𝑥 at the end of the game. Thus, the desired back transfer is twice the 
amount sent when Actor 1 proposes equality, or ?̂? = 2𝑥. Similarly, if Actor 2 has the preference 
for equality, he should send back two-thirds of the total surplus 𝑦 = 2𝑥 to Actor 1. 8  
The understanding of these two important conditions allows us to develop a model by 
recognizing Actor 2 as a combination of the following pure types. 
                                                          
8 These conditions can be determined directly by equalizing the earnings of the two players. 𝜋1 = 𝜋2 
implies 10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦 =  10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥, or 𝑦 = 2𝑥. Thus, Actor 2 who has preference for equality should set 





Self -Interested Type: This type of Actor 2 is predicted to behave in the way that is most 
personally beneficial. Thus, the utility function is given directly by his own payoff received at the 
end of the game. 
9) 𝑢2
𝑇1 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 
Since the first derivative with respect to the back transfer is strictly negative 𝑑𝑢2
𝑇1 𝑑𝑦 = −1⁄ , 
Actor 2 maximizes his utility by always setting 𝑦 = 0, or exhibiting no trustworthiness.  
Inequality Aversion Type: This type of Actor 2 maximizes his utility by always imposing 
material equality, or setting 𝑦 = 2𝑥. To allow for the global maximum at the equality condition, 
the utility function for this type of Actor 2 may take the following form 
10) 𝑢2
𝑇2 = − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)
2 
where  𝑎1 > 0  parameterizes the degree to which the preference for inequality aversion motivates 
Actor 2 to exhibit trustworthiness. The rational choice theory indicates 𝑑𝑢2
𝑇2 𝑑𝑦⁄ =
 −2𝑎1[𝑦 − 2𝑥]. Thus, the inequality averse Actor 2 always maximizes his utility at 𝑦 = 2𝑥, and 
experiences the loss of in his utility whenever Actor 1 has a lower or higher payoff than himself.  
Altruism type:  This type of Actor 2 is motivated solely by a strong willingness to sacrifice his 
payoff for the well-being of Actor 1. In technical terms, Actor 2 is altruistic if the first partial 
derivative of his utility function with respect to Actor 1’s payoff is positive and increasing. Thus, 
an altruistic model can be written as  
11)    𝑢2
𝑇3 = 𝑎2(𝑦 − 2𝑥)𝐷 
and 
𝐷 =  {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑦 − 2𝑥 ≥ 0 ;  𝜋2 < 𝜋1 
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑦 − 2𝑥 < 0 ;   𝜋2 > 𝜋1





where 𝑎2 > 0 measures the altruistic preference in Actor 2’s decision making. 𝐷 is a conditional 
variable that indicates whether Actor 1 or Actor 2 has a better payoff at the end of the game.   
Here is how the model works. Actor 2 will choose the optimal back transfer at the level 
of which his utility is maximized, 𝑑𝑢2
𝑇3 𝑑𝑦⁄ =  𝑎2𝐷. This condition implies whether the marginal 
utility of Actor 2 will be zero or non-zero is dependent upon the value of the conditional variable 
𝐷.  Since the parameter  𝑎2 is strictly positive for the altruist, Actor 2 receives the additional 
utility only when Actor 1 achieves a higher payoff: 𝑑𝑢2
𝑇3 𝑑𝑦⁄ =  𝑎2 > 0; 𝐷 = 1; 𝜋2 < 𝜋1. 
Positive reciprocity type:  This type of Actor 2 appreciates Actor 1 who exhibits trust, and 
rewards the trusting behavior by sending a larger back transfer.  Technically, the utility function 
for this type of Actor 2 is strictly increasing in the transfer of Actor 1. 
12)   𝑢2
𝑇4 = (𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥
2)𝑦 
where 𝑏1 > 0 indicates the degree of positive reciprocity, and 𝑏2 > 0 indicates the possibility of 
diminishing returns associated with the positive reciprocity. The model indicates the degree of 
positive reciprocity exhibited by Actor 2 is positive and increasing in the transfer sent by Actor 1, 
but will start to decline at a certain level. In the work of Rankin and Taborsky (2009), the 
experimental evidence suggests the diminishing returns in cooperative behaviors are common and 
widespread in nature.   
Since 𝑑𝑢2
𝑇4 𝑑𝑦⁄ =   𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥
2, Actor 2 maximizes his utility by sending back the 
positive amount only if the transfer of Actor 1 satisfies the following requirements: i) the transfer 
amount is positive, 𝑥 > 0;  and 2) the ratio between the preference for positive reciprocity and the 
diminishing returns outweighs the transfer amount, 𝑏1 𝑏2⁄ > 𝑥. 
9  
                                                          
9 𝑑𝑢2
𝑇4 𝑑𝑦⁄ =   𝑏1𝑥  − 𝑏2𝑥





Intention appreciation type: This type of Actor 2 makes an evaluation on his opponent’s 
intention, and then chooses the appropriate level of the back transfer. The utility function can be 
written as      
13) 𝑢2
𝑇5 =  −𝑏3(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2𝑦 
where 𝑏3 > 0  parameterizes the degree to which Actor 2 cares about Actor 1’s intention toward 
equality. The quadratic term (?̂? − 2𝑥)2 implies Actor 2’s utility will decline when Actor 1 does 
not intend to split all earnings equally, irrespective of whether it is advantageous (?̂? − 2𝑥 < 0) or 
disadvantageous inequality (?̂? − 2𝑥 > 0).  
Since  𝑑𝑢2
𝑇4 𝑑𝑦⁄ =  −𝑏3(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2,  Actor 2’s utility will reach the maximum level 
whenever Actor 1 intends to generate equality by requesting ?̂? = 2𝑥, and the optimal behavior is 
to reward this intention by sending back the desired amount. 
Mixed type: A mixed type of Actor 2 represents real world population that is motivated by all 
types of preferences (i.e., self-interest, altruism, inequality aversion, positive reciprocity, and 
equality intention). Thus, the utility function for this type of Actor 2 is a combination of all pure 
types. 
14)   𝑈2
𝑇𝑀 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)
2 + 𝑎2(𝑦 − 2𝑥)𝐷 + (𝑏1𝑥  − 𝑏2𝑥
2)𝑦 + 𝑏3(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2𝑦 
Since  𝑑𝑈2
𝑇𝑀 𝑑𝑦⁄ =  −1 − 2𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥) + 𝑎2𝐷 − (𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥
2) − 𝑏3(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2  = 0, Actor 2 
maximizes his utility by setting 10 
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Condition (15) indicates a mixed type Actor 2 faces trade-offs because of the multiple types of 
social preferences.  For example, while inequality aversion motivates Actor 2 to set 𝑦 = 2𝑥, self 
interest motivates a smaller value for 𝑦, while altruism motivates a larger value for 𝑦.  Also, this 
model assumes Actor 2 will punish an Actor 1 subject for not proposing equality, with the 
marginal punishment increasing as more inequality is proposed.  
      In the experiment described in the next section, Actor 1 has an opportunity to indicate a 
desired back transfer, along with chosen transfer, and Actor 2 then chooses the back transfer.  
This data is used to test the predictive capability of the mixed model (14).   The values of the 
preference parameters (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏3) can be uniquely identified using the least-squares 
regression to fit the optimization condition (15) to the data. 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Data and Experiment 
 Our empirical analysis aims to test the ability of the theoretical model in eliciting Actor 
2’s preferences for Actor 1’s equality proposal.  We retrieved the experimental data from the 
work of Wuthisatian et al. (2015) which examines the effects of punishment and communication 
on trust and trustworthiness.   
 In the experiment, 260 subjects (130 pairs) recruited from the University of Nevada, 
Reno, including undergraduate students, graduate student, and employees were randomly 
assigned into 4 different treatments. The control treatment is the standard trust game, which 
neither ability to punish nor ability to communicate is available to the first mover. The second 
treatment is identical to the standard trust condition except Actor 1 has an opportunity to impose 
the punishment threat upon Actor 2, but does not have the ability to communicate with Actor 2. 





ability to punish was not allowed. Finally, the forth treatment allows Actor 1 to employ both 
capabilities.  
 The experimental data was collected in a series of 10 sessions, where each session 
randomly assigns subjects into different treatments.  For a given session, subjects were randomly 
allocated into the roles of Actor 1 and Actor 2, except the last few subjects who were placed into 
a role in order to ensure equal numbers of Actor 1 and Actor 2 players.  Actor 1 players were 
always in one room, while Actor 2 players were in another room down the hall.  To ensure 
anonymity, care was taken, primarily by rapidly shepherding a subject into one room or another, 
to ensure players of one type did not ever see the players of the other type.      
 Actor 1 and Actor 2 each receives an endowment of 10 shanks (experimental currency 
units).   By writing on a decision sheet, Actor 1 choses a transfer amount  𝑥 ∈  {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10}  
shanks to send to Actor 2.  Actor 1 is allowed to indicate a desired back-transfer ?̂?  ∈
 {0, 1, 2, . . . , 3𝑥}.  Actor 1 cares about the equality, in this case, his desired back transfer should be 
?̂? = 2𝑥. The decision sheet indicated by Actor 1 is then given to the responder Actor 2, with 
Actor 2 receiving 3 shanks for each shank transferred by Actor 1.  Then, Actor 2 choses the actual 
back-transfer level 𝑦 ∈  {0, 1, 2, . . . , 3𝑥}.  The payoff received by Actor 1 is given by  𝜋1 = 10 −
𝑥 + 𝑦, whereas the payoff for Actor 2 is 𝜋2 = 10 + 3𝑥 − 𝑦.   Similarly, if Actor 2 cares about the 
equality, his back transfer should be given by 𝑦 = 2𝑥.  Each participant was paid two U.S. dollars 
for each shank earned (See Appendix B).  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents a summary of subject behavior across four experimental treatments. The 
means of Actor 1’s transfer over all treatments is 65% of the endowment, ranging from 61.3% in 
treatment 3 to 6.77% in treatment 4. There is no significant difference in the average transfer 





15 shanks. Interestingly, the desired back transfer of Actor 1 is roughly twice the amount sent in 
all four treatments. This implies the average Actor 1 subject is proposing to divide the surplus 
created by his transfer such that the payoffs of the two players are roughly equal.  According to 
the F-test, there is no significant difference (F [3, 126] = 0.14) in the means of the equality 
intention across the four treatments. 
Table 1: A Summary of Subjects’ Behavior 
Variable All subjects Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
  Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. 
x 6.50 6.72 6.13 6.77 6.55 
 (3.37) (3.68) (3.33) (3.65) (3.11) 
y 9.00 11.88 8.10 9.08 8.03 
 (7.42) (7.49) (7.63) (8.33) (6.25) 
?̂? 13.42 14.32 12.49 13.81 13.53 
 (7.60) (8.04) (7.54) (8.20) (7.16) 
𝑦 − 2𝑥 -4.00 -1.56 -4.15 -4.46 -5.08 
 (6.86) (5.66) (8.14) (6.51) (6.26) 
?̂? − 2𝑥 0.42 0.88 0.23 0.27 0.43 
 (4.06) (3.38) (4.43) (4.04) (4.20) 
Observations with 𝜋2 < 𝜋1 77 10 25 13 29 
Observations 130 25 39 26 40 
Notes: Standard deviations (S.D.) are in parentheses.  
Figure 1: Histogram of Proposing Equality 
 






























The histogram presented in Figure 1 indicates 42% of Actor 1 participants (55 of 130 
subjects) express a concern for fair outcomes by proposing to split the earnings of the two players 
equally. We also find that 35% of Actor 1 participants (45 out of 130 subjects) intend to earn 
more money than Actor 2 by requesting back above the equality condition, and only 23 % of 
Actor 1 participants (30 out of 130 subjects) intend to earn less money than Actor 2 by requesting 
back below the equality condition. 
To further examine how Actor 2 responds to Actor 1’s equality proposal, we separate the 
data of each treatment according to whether Actor 1 intends to split all earnings equally. As 
shown in Table 2, the average back transfer of Actor 2 is significantly higher (p < 0.05) in every 
experimental treatment when Actor 1 proposes equality (12.64 in Treatment 1, 8.50 in Treatment 
2, 11.93 in treatment 3, and 9.54 in treatment 4). This result provides a strong indication that 
Actor 2 appreciates Actor 1 who intends to split all earnings equally, and reward this intention 
with a higher degree of positive reciprocity and trustworthiness. Further support for this 
difference in Actor 2’s trustworthiness can be seen in Figure 2. 
Table 2: Splitting Out Proposing Equality 
Variable All subject Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
 ?̂? = 2𝑥 ?̂? ≠ 2𝑥 ?̂? = 2𝑥 ?̂? ≠ 2𝑥 ?̂? = 2𝑥 ?̂? ≠ 2𝑥 ?̂? = 2𝑥 ?̂? ≠ 2𝑥 ?̂? = 2𝑥 ?̂? ≠ 2𝑥 
x 6.84 6.25 6.79 6.64 6.79 5.76 6.36 7.25 7.46 6.11 
 (3.87) (2.96) (4.28) (2.94) (3.72) (3.11) (4.60) (2.18) (2.96) (3.14) 
y 10.67 7.77 12.64 10.91 8.50 7.88 11.93 5.75 9.54 7.30 
 (7.57) (7.10) (7.38) (7.88) (6.53) (8.30) (9.17) (6.00) (6.97) (5.88) 
?̂? 13.67 13.24 13.57 15.27 13.57 11.88 12.71 15.08 14.92 12.85 
 (7.73) (7.55) (8.56) (7.62) (7.45) (7.67) (9.20) (7.03) (5.92) (7.70) 
Observations 55 75 14 11 14 25 14 12 13 27 





Figure 2: Average Back Transfer by Proposing Equality 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 To measure the ability of our model to explain the experimental data, we estimate the 
regression model, in which the functional form is directly guided by the optimizing behavior in 
condition (15). Nevertheless, for completeness, and to give an indication of the robustness of our 
results, we also allow for a non-parametric estimation, where the equality condition (𝑦 − 2𝑥) and 
the equality intention  (?̂? − 2𝑥) are not specifically assumed any predetermined functional form.  
5.1 Parametric Estimation 
Condition (15) indicates the optimizing behavior for the mixed type of Actor 2 can be 
estimated by the following equation: 
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where  𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3 measure the degree to which Actor 2 cares about inequality aversion, 





























obtained from the regression allow us to identify the values of these parameters and the shape of 
the utility function. The results of the regression estimates are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Regression Estimates for Actor 2’s Back Transfer 
Dependent variable: Actor 2's back transfer 
  Model [1]  Model [2] 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
















9.218*** 0.879 -9.171*** 0.903 
Treatment effects    
T2   -0.651 1.165 
T3    -1.809 1.246 
T4     -0.819 1.168 
R2 0.65    0.66   
Observation 130    130   
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance at 1% 
As shown in Table 3, all of the estimated coefficients reveal to have an expected sign in 
both regression models. The coefficients on the transfer variable (3.000 in Model [1] and 2.950 in 
Model [2]) are positive and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that trust reinforces trustworthiness. 
However, this positive relationship exhibits diminishing returns since the coefficient on the 
squared transfer variable (-0.121 in Model [1] and -0.119 in Model [2]) is negative and significant 
(p < 0.01). Further, Model [2] indicates no treatment effects on Actor 2’s trustworthiness. 
In Model [1], the negative coefficient on the equality intention (-0.043) is statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). This result indicates Actor 2 cares about Actor 1’s intention towards 
equality and dislike an unfair proposal intentionally made by Actor 1. The coefficient on 





altruistic preference in Actor 2’s decision making. The positive coefficient particularly indicates 
the altruistic Actor 2 tends to send more money back, approximately 9 shanks higher than the 
equality condition. The value of R2 = 0.65 indicates a large percentage of the variation in Actor 
2’s trustworthy behavior can be rationalized by the combination of these social preferences. 
To identify the shape of Actor 2’s utility function, we then determine the value of the 
preference parameters by equalizing the estimated coefficients from the regression to the 
theoretical prediction in Condition (15). The computed values of these parameters are 
summarized in Table 4.11  








Using condition (15), we can re-write the utility function as:  
16)   𝑢2
𝑇𝑀 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 0.071(𝑦 − 2𝑥)2 + (0.141𝑥  −  0.017𝑥2)𝑦 − 0.006(?̂? −
2𝑥)2𝑦 + 1.302(𝑦 − 2𝑥)𝐷 
The utility function in (16) confirms our theoretical prediction that material self-interest is not a 
single source of motivation for Actor 2 as predicted by standard economic theory. In fact, Actor 2 
is motivated to exhibit trustworthiness by multiple types of social preferences. 
 For an altruist, his utility function can be expressed as 𝑢2
𝑇𝑀 = 1.302(𝑦 − 2𝑥)𝐷. This 
specific form of utility function indicates if Actor 2 can help Actor 1 to achieve a higher payoff in 
                                                          






the game (𝐷 = 1; 𝜋2 < 𝜋1), he receives the additional utility (of 1.302 units) for each shank of 
the back transfer above the equality condition. On the other hand, the utility function of the 
inequality-averse Actor 2 𝑢2
𝑇𝑀 = −0.071(𝑦 − 2𝑥)2 indicates Actor 2 suffers the loss (of 0.071 
unit) for each shank of the back transfer above or below the equality condition. More precisely, 
the inequality-averse Actor 2 maximizes his utility only when the back transfer is roughly twice 
the amount sent by Actor 1. The estimated utility functions for altruism and inequality aversion 
are presented graphically in Figure 3.           
Figure 3: Altruism and Inequality Aversion. 
 
 The utility function of Actor 2 who is motivated by the preference for positive reciprocity 
can be written as 𝑢2
𝑇𝑀 = (0.141𝑥  −  0.017𝑥2)𝑦. This indicates, for a given amount of the back 
transfer, this type of Actor 2 receives additional utility when observing an increase in the transfer 
amount sent by Actor 1. However, the diminishing returns (0.017) suggest that the utility from 
exhibiting positive reciprocity will reach its maximum level, and eventually start to decline at a 
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Figure 4: Positive Reciprocity 
 
 The utility function of Actor 2 who places a strong preference for Actor 1’s intention 
toward equality can be written as 𝑢2
𝑇𝑀 = −0.006(?̂? − 2𝑥)2𝑦.  Since 𝑑𝑢2
𝑇𝑀 𝑑𝑦⁄ =
−0.006(?̂? − 2𝑥)2, Actor 2’s utility is negatively affected by the intended deviation from the 
equitable outcome proposed by Actor 1, irrespective of whether it is disadvantageous or 
advantageous inequality. This type of Actor 2 appreciates Actor 1 who intends split all earnings 
equally by setting ?̂? = 2𝑥, and reward this intention with positive reciprocity. Figure 5 presents 
the estimated utility function for intention towards equality. 
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5.2 Robustness Checks 
As mentioned, we also perform the non-parametric estimation, where the equality condition 
(𝑦 − 2𝑥) and the equality intention (?̂? − 2𝑥) are allowed to take the non-predetermined 
functional form.  We first analyze the nature and distribution of these two variables and 
categorize them into a set of dummy variables. Figure 6 presents the distribution of each variable, 
and Table 5 provides a summary of the dummy variables. 
Figure 6: Distributions of Equality Condition and Equality Intention 
 
Table 5: A Summary of Dummy Variables 






1  𝑖𝑓 𝑦 − 2𝑥 < 0
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 𝑠1 




1  𝑖𝑓 𝑦 − 2𝑥 = 0
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 𝑠2 




1  𝑖𝑓 𝑦 − 2𝑥 > 0
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 𝑠3 
1 𝑖𝑓 − 4.4 <  ?̂? − 2𝑥 ≤ 0.4
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
  𝑠4 
1 𝑖𝑓 0.4 < ?̂? − 2𝑥 ≤ 5.2
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
  𝑠5 










































 Substituting the dummy variables presented in Table 5 into condition (15), we then can 
rewrite the utility function as  
17)    𝑢2
𝑇𝑀 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)
2 + (𝑏1𝑥  − 𝑏2𝑥
2)𝑦 −  (𝑑1𝑠1 + 𝑑2𝑠2 + 𝑑3𝑠3 +
              𝑑4𝑠4 + 𝑑5𝑠5)𝑦 + (𝑘1𝑟1 + 𝑘2𝑟2 + 𝑘3𝑟3)(𝑦 − 2𝑥) 




=  −1 − 2𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥) + (𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥
2)𝑦 − (𝑑1𝑠1 + 𝑑2𝑠2 + 𝑑3𝑠3 + 𝑑4𝑠4 + 𝑑5𝑠5)
+ ( 𝑘1𝑟1 + 𝑘2𝑟2 + 𝑘3𝑟3)  = 0 
To maximize the utility, Actor 2 will choose the optimal level of the back transfer at 
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, 𝑚2 = − 
𝑑3
2𝑎1
, 𝑚3 = − 
𝑑3
2𝑎1
, 𝑚4 = − 
𝑑4
2𝑎1
, 𝑚5 = − 
𝑑5
2𝑎1
, then we can rewrite condition (18) 
as 
19) 𝑦∗ =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑥 + 𝛾2𝑥2 + 𝑚1𝑠1 + 𝑚2𝑠2 + 𝑚3𝑠3 + 𝑚4𝑠4 + 𝑚5𝑠5 + 𝑘1𝑟1 + 𝑘2𝑟2 + 𝑘3𝑟3 
Therefore, we can apply the least squares regression to estimate Actor 2’s optimizing behavior. 







Table 6: Robustness Test in Opponent’s Intention 
                               Dependent variable: Actor 2's back transfer 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
Constant -6.632*** 1.486 
𝑥 2.924*** 0.512 
𝑥2 -0.111** 0.044 
𝑠1 -5.538* 3.136 
𝑠2 -1.884 1.289 
𝑠4 -1.792 1.167 
𝑠5 -4.592*** 1.368 
𝑟2 7.367*** 1.009 
𝑟3 13.220*** 1.320 
Observation 130  
R2 0.69  
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance at 1% 
 
As can be seen from Table 6, the signs and significant levels of all coefficients are 
consistent with the parametric regression. Consider the equality intention variable we can see that 
the negative coefficients on 𝑠1 and 𝑠5 variables are significantly different from zero. This implies 
the function of back transfer chosen by Actor 2 is strictly concave, and it has a relative maximum 
in the domain of Actor 1’s intention towards equality.  In the other words, Actor 2 appreciates the 
intention toward the equitable outcomes proposed by Actor 1, and reward the equality intention 
by sending back the desired amount.  However, if Actor 1 does not propose equality, Actor 2 
experiences a significant loss in his utility, and corrects this inequality intention by sending back 
less than the desired amount. Figure 7 presents the relationship between Actor 2’s optimizing 








Figure 7: Relationship between the Back Transfer and the Equality Intention 
 
 
Following the same approach, we estimate the values of the preference parameters in Table 7 by 
equalizing the theoretical parameters in condition (18) and the estimated coefficients from the 
regression.  













                                                          


























Substituting the values presented in Table 8 into condition (18), we can rewrite the utility 
function as 
20)   𝑢2
𝑇𝑀 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 0.075(𝑦 − 2𝑥)2 + (0.139𝑥  −  0.017𝑥2)𝑦 − (0.835𝑠1 +
0.692𝑠5)𝑦 + (1.111𝑟2 + 1.993𝑟3)(𝑦 − 2𝑥) 
 Condition (20) confirm our previous findings that Actor 2 are strongly motivated to 
exhibit trustworthiness by multiple types of social preferences including inequality aversion, 
positive reciprocity, altruism, and intention towards equality.   
6. Actor 1’s Optimizing Behavior 
In the following, we illustrate that cooperative equilibria in a one-shot game may exist if 
Actor 1 has the ability to recognize the preferences and optimizing behavior of Actor 2.  
Suppose Actor 1 is motivated solely by self-interest, and anticipates multiples of social 
preferences in Actor 2’s decision making. Following Stackelberg’s Model of Duopoly, the 
optimizing behavior of Actor 1 in the first stage of the game can be analyzed using the concept of 
backward induction, beginning with the optimizing behavior of Actor 2 in the second stage. Here, 
we present five possible cases of Actor 1’s behavior in choosing the transfer level.13  
Case 1: Actor 1 anticipates that Actor 2 is motivated purely by self-interest. 
 Knowing the utility function of the self-interested Actor 2 is the game payoff 𝑢2 = 10 −
𝑦 + 3𝑥, Actor 2 will not provide any back transfer because his marginal utility of exhibiting 
trustworthiness is strictly negative 𝑑𝑢2 𝑑𝑦⁄ − 1 < 0. Anticipating this, Actor 1 will not transfer 
anything to Actor 2. Thus, the Nash equilibrium prediction is (𝑥∗ = 0, 𝑦∗ = 0). 
                                                          





Case 2: Actor 1 anticipates that Actor 2 is motivated by a composition of self-interest and 
inequality aversion. 
The utility function of Actor 2 who has the preference for self-interest and inequality 
aversion is given by 𝑢2 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)
2. To analyze Actor 1’s optimal behavior, 
we first examine the optimizing behavior of Actor 2, which yields 𝑦∗ =  − 1 2𝑎1⁄ + 2𝑥. Since 
Actor 1 recognizes Actor 2’s reaction in the second stage, he anticipates the amount of the back 
transfer at  𝑦∗. Subsequently, Actor 1’s problem in the first stage amounts to 
21)   𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥  𝑢1 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥  [10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦








 will converge to zero if Actor 2 is purely inequality averse. Condition (21) implies Actor 
1 can be better off by allocating all of his endowment to the Actor 2 who is motivated by a 
combination of self-interest and inequality aversion. Thus, the optimizing behavior of Actor 1 is 
to exhibit the highest degree of trust.     
Case 3: Actor 1 anticipates Actor 2 is motivated by a composition of self-interest, inequality 
aversion, and positive reciprocity. 
Under the combined preferences for self-interest, inequality aversion, and positive 
reciprocity, the utility function for Actor 2 is given by 𝑢2 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)
2 +
(𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥
2)𝑦. Thus, Actor 2 maximizes his utility by setting 










Since Actor 1 can recognize Actor 2’s optimal behavior in the second stage, he should 
anticipate the back transfer at 𝑦∗. Thus, Actor 1’s optimization problem in the first stage of the 





















𝑥 = 0, the optimal transfer chosen by Actor 1 is then 







In this case, Actor 1’s optimal behavior is to transfer the positive amount (𝑥∗ > 0).  
Case 4: Actor 1 anticipates that Actor 2 is motivated by a omposition of self-interest, inequality 
aversion, positive reciprocity, and intention towards equality 
 
The utility function of Actor 2 who has the combined preferences for self-interest, 
inequality aversion, positive reciprocity, and intention towards equality is given by 𝑢2 = 10 −
𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)
2 + (𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥
2)𝑦 − 𝑏3(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2𝑦.  Following the same approach, the 
optimal back transfer chosen by Actor 2 is 






+ 2) 𝑥 −
𝑏2
2𝑎1
𝑥2 −  
𝑏3
2𝑎1
(?̂? − 2𝑥)2 
Since Actor 1 can solve Actor 2’s problem, he expects to receive the back transfer at 𝑦∗ in the 
second stage. Thus, his optimization problem in the first stage is  













(?̂? − 2𝑥)2]] 
The first-order condition indicates 
𝑑𝑢1
𝑑𝑥






𝑥 −  
𝑏3
𝑎1
 (?̂? − 2𝑥)(−2) = 0 
Subsequently, the optimal transfer chosen by Actor 1 is 


































Condition (27) indicates Actor 1’s optimizing behavior is to transfer the positive amount(𝑥∗ >
0), and the optimal transfer depends upon the desired back transfer that Actor 1 would like 
request. A plausible explanation for this condition is that, while recognizing the preference for 
intention towards equality in Actor 2’s motivation, Actor 1 needs to think more carefully about 
the desired amount he would like request back before choosing the transfer level. 
Case 5: Actor 1 anticipates that Actor 2 is motivated by a composite of self-interest and all types 
of social preferences, including inequality aversion, positive reciprocity, intention towards 
equality, and altruism. 
The utility function of Actor 2 is given by 𝑢2 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)
2 + 𝑎2(𝑦 −
2𝑥)𝐷 + (𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥
2)𝑦 +  𝑏3(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2𝑦. For an arbitrary choice of Actor 1’s transfer, Actor 
2’s optimal behavior is then 






+ 2) 𝑥 −
𝑏2
2𝑎1
𝑥2 −  
𝑏3
2𝑎1
(?̂? − 2𝑥)2 + 𝑎2𝐷 
Note that the only difference between condition (27) and (28) is the fixed term 𝑎2𝐷 that 
represents the preference of altruism in Actor 2’s motivation. The interpretation of the fixed term 
is the altruistic Actor 2 also cares about the well-being of Actor 1, and he would like to make 
Actor 1 better off by sending more money. 
Since Actor 1 can recognize Actor 2’s optimal behavior, he anticipates the back transfer 
at 𝑦∗ in the second stage. Therefore, Actor 1’s optimization problem in the first stage is given by  
29)  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑢1 = 10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦∗ = 












(?̂? − 2𝑥)2 + 𝑎2𝐷]] 
The first-order condition implies 
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Subsequently, the optimal transfer chosen by Actor 1 is 





























?̂?  >   0 
Similar to the previous case, condition (30) suggests Actor 1’s optimal behavior is to transfer the 
positive amount to Actor 2, and the optimal transfer level depends upon the desired back transfer.  
Anticipating Actor 2’s preferences for inequality aversion (𝑎1 > 0), positive reciprocity 










, is expected to have a positive sign. This implies the transfer of Actor 1 is increasing 
function of his own desired back transfer.  Substituting the computed values of all preference 
parameters from Table 3 into condition (30), we learn  
31) 𝑥∗ = 3.45 +  0.30?̂? 
Condition (31) indicates Actor 1 is likely to exhibit more trust if he expects more trustworthiness 
from Actor 2. 
Previous experiments have provided strong evidence supporting this positive relationship. 
For example, Neaf and Schuup (2009) report a strong positive correlation (Spearman’s rank 
correlation "ρ = 0.18" at p < 0.01 level) between the transfer and the desired back transfer. 
Bicchieri et al. (2010) transform the desired back transfer into the percentage of the tripled 
investment ?̂? 3𝑥⁄ , which is referred to as “the expected reciprocity”. This variable is then 
regressed against the transfer of Actor 1. The results indicate Actor 1 send the additional $0.10 
for each percent increase in the expected reciprocity. Similarly, Sapienza et al. (2007) also report 
a strong positive correlation between the desired transfer and the transfer amount above 40 





6.1 Empirical Evidence of Actor 1’s Optimal Behavior 
In the following, we measure the quality of our theoretical model in explaining Actor 1’s 
behavior by empirically estimating the relationship between the transfer and the desired back 
transfer using the same set of experimental data.  
Since subjects in the experiment are paired anonymously and they do not know the 
identity of their opponent, we assume that Actor 1 will anticipate all types of preferences (self-
interest, inequality aversion, positive reciprocity, intention towards equality, and altruism) in 
Actor 2’s decision making. Thus, Actor 1’s optimizing behavior is  





























?̂?    
We can also write it as 













































, then we have 
32)  𝑥∗ =  𝜔0 + 𝜔1?̂? 
If Actor 1 anticipates all types of preferences in Actor 2’s motives as we hypothesized, the 
estimated coefficients from the regression should fairly be identical to the theoretical prediction 






Table 8: Regression Estimates for Actor 1’s Transfer 
Dependent variable: Actor 1's transfer   
  Model [1] Model [2] 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Constant 1.458*** 0.322 1.340*** 0.474 
 ?̂? 0.376*** 0.021 0.376*** 0.021 
Treatment effects    
T4   0.097 0.468 
T3   0.242 0.510 
T4   0.129 0.465 
R2 0.72  0.72  
Observation 130  130  
* Significance at 10% 
** Significance at 5% 
*** Significance at 1% 
 The positive coefficients on the desired back transfer are significant (p < 0.01) in both 
models, confirming our hypothesis that Actor 1’s transfer is exogenously determined by the 
desired amount he would like request back. That is, Actor 1 will send addition 0.376 shank to 
Actor 2 for each shank increase in his desired back transfer. The overall fit, R2 = 0.72, seems 
reasonable for such a diverse group of Actor1 subjects in this cross-sectional data.  
However, we observe a slightly difference between the theoretical prediction (0.300) in 
condition (31) and the estimated coefficients (0.376) in Table 8. A plausible explanation for this 
difference is that Actor 1 may not be a profit maximizer who is motivated purely by the self-
interest, and there may be multiple types of social preferences (e.g., inequality aversion, altruism, 
and reciprocity) that plays role in his decision making as well. Future research could seek to 
integrate these social preferences into Actor 1’s utility function. This would provide valuable 
insight into the determinant of trusting behavior. 
7. Summary 
In summary, this paper makes an important contribution to the literature by developing a 





composite of material self-interest and multiple types of social preferences including fairness, 
positive reciprocity, and altruism. The model specifically features the potential which proposing 
equality has for promoting positive reciprocal behavior. In particular, the second mover 
appreciates the first mover that intends to an equitable outcome and rewards this intention with 
positive reciprocity.   
The prediction of our theoretical model is strongly consistent with the evidence collected 
from the trust experiment.  Our empirical results suggest, when the first mover proposes equality 
by indicating the desired back transfer roughly twice the amount sent, the second mover 
maximizes his utility and reciprocates this equality intention by sending back the desired amount. 
On the other hand, when the first mover does not propose equality, the second mover experiences 
the utility loss from this inequality intention and responses by sending back less than the desired 
amount. 
Knowing the optimizing behavior and preference of the second mover, we then disclose 
the linkages between trust and trustworthiness by analyzing the first mover’s optimizing 
behavior. We illustrate the ability to recognize the second mover’s preferences will encourage the 
first mover to exhibit more trust and behave more cooperatively. In addition, our model indicates 
the degree of trust exhibited by the first mover can be explained exogenously by his own desired 
back transfer, or the expectation on the second mover’s trustworthiness. Consistent with the 
theoretical prediction, our empirical results suggest the first mover will send additional 0.376 
shank to the second mover for each shank increase in the desired back transfer. The interpretation 
here is, once the first mover can recognize the preference for equality intention in the second 
mover, he think more carefully and more strategically about the desired amount he would like to 
request back before making the transfer decision. It is an interesting task for future research to 





The model in this paper assumes that the first mover is motivated purely by self-interest, 
and aim to maximize his own benefit. However, it is not necessarily for the first mover to exhibit 
trust only because of his ability to recognize the preference of the second mover. There may also 
be multiple types of social preferences that encourage the trusting behavior (e.g., fairness, 
altruism, generosity, or reciprocity). It is an interesting task for future research to integrate these 
preference into the first mover’s motives. This would provide valuable insight into the 
determinant of trust.    
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Mathematical note for theoretical model.  
The utility function for mixed types of Actor 2 is given by 
𝑢2
𝑇𝑀 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)
2 + 𝑎2(𝑦 − 2𝑥)𝐷2 − 𝑏1(?̂? − 2𝑥)





=  −1 − 2𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥) + 𝑎2𝐷2 − 𝑏1(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2 + 𝑏2𝑥 − 𝑏3𝑥
2 = 0 
2𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥) = −1 + 𝑎2𝐷2 − 𝑏1(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2 + 𝑏2𝑥 − 𝑏3𝑥
2 = 0 
Rearrange the terms, we can re-write it as 







































Appendix B: Instructions for the experiment. 
 
You are actor 1 
Description of Your Decision Problem 
You are a participant in the following decision-making problem.  You have been randomly matched 
with another participant in this problem who is in another room.  You will never be informed of 
the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant 
will never be informed about your identity.  You are in the role of actor 1 and the matched 
participant is in the role of actor 2.  You as well as actor 2 participate only once in this decision 
problem.  You make your decisions with the help of the decision sheet that has been handed out 
together with this description.  Here are the rules that you and actor 2 have to obey when you make 
your decisions: 
Endowment 
At the beginning both actors receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks (experimental currency 
units) 
Your decision 
You have to make a decision that consists of two components: 
1)  A transfer between 0 and 10 shanks to actor 2. 
You can transfer any amount between 0 and 10 shanks to actor 2.  You make this decision 
by indicating a number between 0 and 10 in the appropriate box on your decision sheet.  
We will then triple this transferred amount, i.e., actor 2 receives three times the amount of 
shanks you transferred. 
2)  A desired back-transfer from actor 2. 
After you have made your transfer to actor 2 you indicate a desired back-transfer on your 
decision sheet.  The desired back-transfer is the amount you would like to receive back 
from actor 2.  The desired back-transfer can be any number between 0 and three times the 
amount you have transferred. 
The decision of actor 2 
Once you have fixed both components of your decision sheet, we collect your decision sheet and 
give it to actor 2.  In this way we inform actor 2 about your decisions.  The actor 2 can transfer any 
amount of the total number of shanks he received back to you. 
Payoffs 
You as actor 1 received: 10 shanks – transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from actor 2. 
Actor 2 receives: 10 shanks + 3*transfer from actor 1 – back-transfer to actor 1. 






You are actor 1 
Description of a New Decision Problem 
You now participate in a new decision-making problem.  As before, you have been randomly 
matched with another participant in another room.  You are again in the role of actor 1.  The other 
participant is in the role of actor 2.  Notice that in this new decision problem you are matched with 
a new person, i.e., actor 2 is now a different person compared too the previous problem.  Once 
again, you will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the 
experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. 
The new decision problem is—with one exception—identical to the previous problem.  The 
exception concerns the conditional payoff cut.  In the new problem you can impose a condition 
payoff cut of 4 shanks on actor 2.  In every other respect the problem is the same.  Thus both actors 
again receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks. 
Your decision 
Again you have to indicate on your decision sheet what amount you want to transfer to actor 2 and 
what your desired back-transfer is.  Actor 2 receives three times the amount of shanks you 
transferred. 
In addition to the transfer and desired back-transfer you also have to indicate on your decision sheet 
if you want to impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks on actor 2. 
 A conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks for actor 2 has the following consequences: The payoff 
of actor 2 will be reduced by 4 shanks if his actual back-transfer is less than your desired 
back-transfer.  The conditional payoff cut is not due, i.e., it does not reduce the income of 
actor 2, if actor 2 transfers exactly your desired amount or more to you 
 If you do not impose a conditional payoff cut—the income of actor 2 will not be reduced, 
irrespective of how large the back-transfer of actor 2 is. 
 
The decision of actor 2 
Once you have fixed all three components of your decision sheet, we collect your decision sheet 
and give it to actor 2.  In this way we inform actor 2 about your decisions.  The actor 2 can transfer 
any amount of the total number of shanks he received back to you.  In case that you have chose a 
conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks, and if actor 2 transfers back less than what you desired, the 
conditional payoff cut is due. 
Payoffs 
You as actor 1 received: 10 shanks – transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from actor 2. 
Actor 2 receives: 10 shanks + 3*transfer from actor 1 – back-transfer to actor 1 - 4 
shanks (in case that a conditional payoff cut has been imposed and is due). 







You are actor 2 
Description of Your Decision Problem 
You are a participant in the following decision-making problem.  You have been randomly matched 
with another participant in this problem who is in another room.  You will never be informed of 
the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment; similarly, your matched participant 
will never be informed about your identity.  You are in the role of actor 2 and the matched 
participant is in the role of actor 2.  You as well as actor 1 participate only once in this decision 
problem.  You make your decisions with the help of the decisions sheet that has been handed out 
together with this description.  Here are the rules that you and actor 1 have to obey when you make 
your decisions: 
Endowment 
At the beginning both actors receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks (experimental currency 
units). 
The decision of actor 1 
First actor 1 has to make a decision that consists of the following two components: 
1)  A transfer between 0 and 10 shanks to actor 2. 
Actor 1 can transfer any amount between 0 and 10 shanks to you.  Actor 1 makes this 
decision by indicating a number between 0 and 10 in the appropriate box on the decision 
sheet.  We will then triple this transferred amount, i.e., you will receive three times the 
amount of shanks you transferred. 
2)  A desired back-transfer from actor 2. 
After actor 1 has made a transfer to you he indicated a desired back-transfer on your 
decision sheet.  The desired back-transfer is the amount he would like to receive back from 
you.  The desired back-transfer can be any number between 0 and three times the amount 
that actor 1 has transferred to you. 
Your decision 
Once actor 1 has fixed both components of the decision, we collect the decision sheet and give it 
to you.  In this way we inform you about actor 1’s decisions.  Then you can transfer any amount of 
the total number of shanks you received back to actor 1.   
Payoffs 
Actor 1 receives: 10 shanks – transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from actor 2. 
You as actor 2 receive: 10 shanks + 3*transfer from actor 1 – back-transfer to actor 1. 





You are actor 2 
Description of a New Decision Problem 
You will now participate in a new decision-making problem.  As before, you have been randomly 
matched with another participant in another room.  You are again in the role of actor 2.  The other 
participant is in the role of actor 1.  Notice that in this new decision problem you are matched with 
a new person, i.e., actor 1 is now a different person compared too the previous problem.  Once 
again, you will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the 
experiment; similarly, your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. 
The new decision problem is—with one exception—identical to the previous problem.  The 
exception concerns the conditional payoff cut.  In the new problem actor 1 can impose a condition 
payoff cut of 4 shanks on you.  In every other respect the problem is the same.  Thus both actors 
again receive an initial endowment of 10 shanks. 
The decision of actor 1 
Again actor 1 has to indicate on the decision sheet what amount he wants to transfer to you and 
what his desired back-transfer is.  You receive three times the amount of shanks actor 1 transferred 
to you. 
In addition to the transfer and desired back-transfer actor 1 also has to indicate on the decision sheet 
if you want to impose a conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks on you. 
 A conditional payoff cut of 4 shanks has the following consequences for you: Your payoff 
will be reduced by 4 shanks if your actual back-transfer is less than the desired back-
transfer of actor 1.  The conditional payoff cut is not due, i.e., it does not reduce your 
income, if you transfer exactly the desired amount or more to actor 1. 
 If actor 1 does not impose a conditional payoff cut—your income will not be reduced, 
irrespective of how large your back-transfer to actor 1 is. 
 
Your decision 
Once actor 1 has fixed all three components of the decision, we collect the decision sheet and give 
it to you.  In this way we inform you about actor 1’s decisions.  Then you can transfer any amount 
of the total number of shanks received back to actor 1.  In case that actor 1 imposed a conditional 
payoff cut of 4 shanks, and if you transfer back less than actor 1’s desired amount, the conditional 
payoff cut is due. 
Payoffs 
Actor 1 receives: 10 shanks – transfer to actor 2 + back-transfer from actor 2. 
You as actor 2 receive: 10 shanks + 3*transfer from actor 1 – back-transfer to actor 1 - 4 
shanks (in case that a conditional payoff cut has been imposed and is due). 





Appendix C: Mathematical note for the estimated preferences.  
 






] 𝑥 −  [
𝑏2
2𝑎1
] 𝑥2 − [
𝑏3
2𝑎1




Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 95% Confident Interval 
Constant -7.081*** 1.487 -10.023 -4.139 
𝑥 3.000*** 0.519 1.973 4.027 
𝑥2 -0.121*** 0.043 -0.206 -0.036 
(?̂? − 2𝑥)2 -0.043*** 0.014 -0.071 -0.015 
𝐷 9.218*** 0.879 7.478 10.958 
Observation 130    
R2 0.65    
* Significance at 10%    
** Significance at 5%    




=  −7.08 →  𝑎1 = 0.07 
𝑎2
2𝑎1
= 9.21 → 𝑎2 =   1.302  
(𝑏1 + 4𝑎1)
2𝑎1





















Appendix D: Mathematical note for the estimated preferences, robustness checks. 






] 𝑥 −  [
𝑏2
2𝑎1
] 𝑥2 − [
𝑑1
2𝑎1
] 𝑠1 − [
𝑑2
2𝑎1
] 𝑠2 − [
𝑑3
2𝑎1
] 𝑠3 − [
𝑑4
2𝑎1







] 𝑟1 + [
𝑐2
2𝑎1




Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 95% Confident Interval 
Constant -6.632*** 1.486 -9.573 -3.690 
𝑥 2.924*** 0.512 1.910 3.938 
𝑥2 -0.111** 0.044 -0.197 -0.025 
𝑠1 -5.538* 3.136 -11.747 0.670 
𝑠2 -1.884 1.289 -4.436 0.668 
𝑠4 -1.792 1.167 -4.102 0.518 
𝑠5 -4.592*** 1.368 -7.299 -1.884 
𝑟2 7.367*** 1.009 5.369 9.364 
𝑟3 13.220*** 1.320 10.606 15.834 
Observation 130    
R2 0.69    
* Significance at 10%   
** Significance at 5%   




=  −6.632 →  𝑎1 = 0.075  
(𝑏1 + 4𝑎1)
2𝑎1




=  −0.111 → 𝑏2 =  0.017 
𝑑1
2𝑎1




=  0 → 𝑑2 = 0 
𝑑4
2𝑎1
= 0 → 𝑑4 = 0 
𝑑5
2𝑎1
= −4.592 →  𝑑5 = −0.692 
𝑐2
2𝑎1
=  7.367 → 𝑐2 = 1.111 
𝑐3
2𝑎1





Appendix E: Actor 1’s optimal behavior. 
Case 1: Actor 1 believes that Actor 2 is motivated solely by self-interest 
𝑢2 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥  
𝑑𝑢2
𝑑𝑦
= −1 < 0  
Actor 2 will send back nothing, and Actor 1 anticipates this reaction. Thus, there is no trust. 
Case 2: Actor 1 believes that Actor 2 is motivated by a composite of self-interest and the 
preferences for inequality aversion 




= −1 − 2𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥) = 0  
2𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥) =  −1 
2𝑎1𝑦 =  −1 + 4𝑎1𝑥 





𝑢1 = 10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦
∗  










= 1 > 0 
Consequently, Actor 1 is willing to transfer positive amount so as to maximize his utility. 
Case 3: Actor 1 believes that there are three types of preferences that motivate Actor 2, including 
self-interest, inequality aversion, and positive reciprocity 
𝑢2 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)




=  −1 − 2𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥) + 𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥
2 = 0 
2𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥) =  −1 + 𝑏1𝑥  − 𝑏2𝑥
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𝑢1 = 10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦
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=  −1 +  
𝑏1
2𝑎1
+ 2 − 
𝑏2
𝑎1
𝑥 = 0 
𝑏2
𝑎1










> 0  
Therefore, the optimal behavior for Actor 1 is to transfer the positive amount. 
Case 4: Actor 1 believes that there are four types of preferences that motivate Actor 2 including 
self-interest, inequality aversion, positive reciprocity, and intention based reciprocity 
𝑢2 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)
2 + (𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥




=  −1 − 2𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥) + 𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥
2 − 𝑏3(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2 = 0 
2𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥) = −1 + 𝑏1𝑥  −  𝑏2𝑥
2 − 𝑏3(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2 
2𝑎1𝑦 = −1 + (𝑏1 + 4𝑎1)𝑥 − 𝑏2𝑥
2 − 𝑏3(?̂? − 2𝑥)
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+ 2) 𝑥 −
𝑏2
2𝑎1
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𝑏3
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𝑏2
2𝑎1
𝑥2 −  
𝑏3
2𝑎1
(?̂? − 2𝑥)2]  
𝑑𝑢1
𝑑𝑥






𝑥 −   
𝑏3
𝑎1















































?̂?  >   0 
 
Therefore, the optimal behavior for Actor 1 is to transfer positive amount to Actor 2, and the 
amount of transfer is dependent upon the desired back transfer  
Case 5: Actor 1 believes that Actor 2 is motivated by a composite of self-interest and all types of 
social preferences, including inequality aversion, positive reciprocity, and intention based 
reciprocity, and altruism 
𝑢2 = 10 − 𝑦 + 3𝑥 − 𝑎1(𝑦 − 2𝑥)
2 + 𝑎2(𝑦 − 2𝑥)𝐷 + (𝑏1𝑥  − 𝑏2𝑥
2)𝑦 +  𝑏3(?̂? − 2𝑥)
2𝑦 












(?̂? − 2𝑥)2 + 𝑎2𝐷 
 
Also note that D =1 if 𝑦 − 2𝑥 > 0. Altruistic preferences is an additional fixed term on the 
optimal level of back transfer chosen by Actor 2. 
Actor 1: 
𝑢1 = 10 − 𝑥 + 𝑦
∗   






+ 2) 𝑥 −
𝑏2
2𝑎1
𝑥2 −  
𝑏3
2𝑎1
(?̂? − 2𝑥)2 + 𝑎2𝐷] 
𝑑𝑢1
𝑑𝑥






𝑥 −   
𝑏3
𝑎1












































?̂?  >   0  
 
Similar to Case 3, the optimal behavior for Actor 1 is to transfer positive amount to Actor 2, and 
the amount of transfer is dependent upon the desired back transfer.   
